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An Examination of the Effectiveness of a Training Programme to Improve Decision Making 
in Insurance Risk Underwriting 
 
Gavin R. Maistry 
 
This dissertation studies the effectiveness of a training programme to improve decision 
making in insurance risk underwriting. A key component of insurance risk underwriting 
decisions is qualitative judgement, in addition to quantitative analytical modelling. In the 
training of insurance underwriters, great strides have been made on the analytical side. 
However, the training of judgement, both intuitive and deliberate, has largely been ignored. The 
aim of this research proposal is to design and test a training programme to improve judgement 
in insurance underwriting. 
Our research extends the script training concept, used extensively in medical training, 
to the domain of insurance underwriting for the first time. As part of the research, we 
interviewed underwriters of varying levels of experience. We looked to capture the scripts of 
experienced underwriters; contrast this with novices and then use these as a training tool for 
underwriters. We then also looked to extract the simple rules that underlie the intuitive 
judgements in insurance underwriting and use these to formally train more deliberate 
judgements. 
The training intervention was administered to groups of professional underwriters and 
also groups of students. The impact of the training was measured for both accuracy and 
consistency improvements in underwriting decisions. Control groups were also established. We 
also examined the moderating impacts of experience and some components of mindfulness on 
the training impact. The results suggest that the combined scripts and simple rules training 
improves both quality and consistency of underwriting decisions (when compared to the control 
 
 
group). The training design contains the key components needed to develop expertise – the 
scripts technique gives exposure to many cases; the simple rules then provides systematised 
knowledge and the underwriting process ensures objective feedback. 
This study has the impact of accelerating the development of underwriting expertise and 
could potentially save companies billions of dollars in poor underwriting decisions. The 
proposed training design could potentially fundamentally change the training of underwriters 
to include formal training on the important aspects of intuitive and deliberate judgement. This 
will then also help prepare underwriters for managing risks in an increasing innovative and 
riskier world. 
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 “For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them.”- Aristotle  
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
1.1. Introduction to the Insurance and Reinsurance Industries 
Our world is filled with uncertainty and randomness. Insurance companies or insurers 
are the legal entities that cover the financial consequences that emerges from the occurrence of 
certain of these unexpected events. Hence, insurers provide financial security to customers. 
Insurers offer this benefit in exchange for payment of a predetermined amount of money called 
the “premium”. Insurance is therefore a means of reducing uncertainty. In return for buying an 
insurance policy for a smaller, known premium, the possibility of a larger loss is removed. By 
pooling premiums and insured events, the financial impact of an event that could be disastrous 
for one policyholder is spread among a wider group i.e. the mutualisation of risk. By this 
pooling of similar risks together insurance companies transform the unpredictability of the 
occurrence of such contingent events into more expected events, they can price and manage.  
This transfer of risk is of great significance for the functioning of our modern economies e.g. 
numerous consumers may not purchase new expensive cars or houses if they do not have the 
option of insuring them (Desai, 2016). The value of this certainty to society is huge. 
Reinsurers are firms that insurers pass on risk to and can be viewed as B2B insurance 
or wholesale insurance provider. Put simply, reinsurance is insurance for insurers. The financial 
compensation that would be required in the event of a commercial airline plane crash, for 
example, could be too great for a single insurer, so reinsurance is sought to share the loss. 
Alternatively, a certain level of the risk from, say, an insurer’s motor or life insurance business 
could be transferred to a reinsurer. Hence, reinsurers play a vital role in risk management of 
insurance companies – ensuring the financial stability of the insurance companies and 
ultimately giving insurance consumers financial security and peace of mind. Reinsurers can 
also act as consultants to the insurance companies especially in the field of underwriting various 
types of insurance risks where they bring their global reach and knowledge to the table. 




1.2. Introduction to Insurance Risk Underwriting  
An insurance or reinsurance underwriter is a professional whose job it is to understand 
to understand the risks to which an insurer/reinsurer is exposed to – and ultimately accept or 
decline the risk. The coverage the client should receive; premium and terms of the insurance 
contract are based on the underwriter’s assessment of the level of the risk. The word 
"underwriter" originated from the practice of having each risk-taker write his name under the 
total amount of risk he was willing to accept at a specified premium (Bernstein, 
1998). Underwriting includes all strategies, methods and processes to – identify, analyse, 
assess, control and monitor the short and long term risks an insurer/reinsurer faces or may face 
in the future. Their main task is to help the insurance/reinsurance company to build a portfolio 
of profitable insurance risks. The function of the underwriter is ultimately to protect the 
insurer's/reinsurer’s book of business from risks that they feel will make a loss. Thus, 
underwriting is the key tool to reduce losses, control uncertainty and optimise decision making 
to improve performance of insurers/reinsurers. 
The underwriting skill is gained not only through theoretical study but is also the result 
of years of experience dealing with similar risks and pricing and paying claims on those risks. 
Their underwriting work requires a combination of strong analytical skills, business knowledge 
and understanding of human behaviour to design and manage programs that control risk. 
Experienced underwriters tend to develop over time a sense for each application of risk transfer. 
Underwriting can be done by actuaries or other insurance professionals who are schooled in 
finance and risk management. The Society of Actuaries (SOA, 2010) defines an actuary as a 
business professional who analyses the financial consequences of risk. Most underwriters 
specialize in certain types of risks, for example Life and Health (L&H) risks are usually 
underwritten by medical doctors; Property risks by professional engineers; legal risks by 
lawyers; etc. Some underwriters in more senior management roles have to be more generalists 
and look at the fuller spectrum of risks that the insurer/reinsurer assumes.  




1.3. The Challenge in Making Insurance Risk Underwriting Decisions 
There is significant challenge in making underwriting decisions and the longer the 
insurance/reinsurance coverage period the wider the range of outcomes which is sometimes 
referred to as the widening “cone of uncertainty” (Tetlock, 2015) – the cone that surrounds the 
main prediction and gives a range of possibilities. Hence, insurance underwriting is a 
challenging task – requiring a significant amount of technical skills and experience. In some 
circles, underwriting is considered to be more art than science. It is a well-established fact 
within the industry that the complex forecasts and decisions that underwriters and actuaries 
have to make cannot be based totally on mechanical analysis of data and models of finance and 
risk management. Underwriters have to deal with real life uncertainty and incomplete 
information which cannot be captured in risk models which require well defined outcomes and 
associated probabilities (Knight, 1921). Hence underwriters and actuaries have to combine 
models with their professional expert judgement to make decisions. Also, certain aspects like 
customer or policyholder behaviour is very difficult to judge and impossible to incorporate fully 
in a mathematical model and require a thorough understanding of human behaviour.  
1.4. The Role of Judgement in Insurance Risk Underwriting Decisions 
The term judgement refers to the cognitive aspects of the decision-making process and 
to fully understand judgement, we must identify the component of the decision-making process 
that require it (Bazerman and Moore, 2009). A popular distinction in cognitive and social 
psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgements (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 
2011). This contrast has aligned in dual-process theories of unconscious, effortless processes 
(assumed to foster intuitive judgements) versus conscious, effortful and ruled-based analytic 
rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgements). Kahneman (2011) describes 
two modes of thinking. The first is fast, intuitive and applied so often in our daily lives that it 
takes over almost automatically (System 1). The second is slow, rational and calculating, and 
takes a lot of work (System 2) – like statistical, rational processes (Kahneman, 2001).  




A better understanding of expert intuitive and deliberate judgements made in insurance 
underwriting decisions could help prevent underwriters making the same blunders such as an 
over-reliance on financial models.  Blind reliance and over confidence in financial models have 
been argued to be a major cause of recent financial crises (Derman, 2011). Banks failed to fully 
appreciate that these models were attempting to model complex systems (Waldrop, 1992) like 
stock markets or credit markets. This modelling made simplifying assumptions and failed to 
account for interactions, correlation and contagion in the system. The models could not capture 
all the complexities of the real world environments and markets. There was a need to apply 
common sense and good judgement when assessing such complex financial risks to account for 
factors that could not be modelled. The same happens in the world of insurance underwriting 
where we tend to look for shelter in “models” and frequently fall prey to the “illusion of control” 
(Langer and Roth, 1975). We overestimate our ability to predict the future, and as a result we 
underestimate uncertainty that still prevails and the mechanisms to cope with this (Kahneman, 
2001). Judgement, both intuitive and deliberate,  is the key tool to deal with the uncertainty not 
captured in models yet most of the research and training still focuses on models.  
Underwriters have to make time constrained decisions concerning complex insurance 
problems or situations. Intuition plays a key role in these decisions. Intuition is rather difficult 
to define but rather easy to recognize (Hogarth, 2001). The root of the term ‘intuition’ may be 
traced to the Latin intueor or intueri meaning ‘to contemplate’ or ‘look within’  (Sadler-Smith 
and Shefy, 2004). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) defined intuitive judgements as those that 
are arrived at by an informal and unstructured mode of reasoning without the use of analytical 
methods or deliberative calculation. Intuition should not be confused with other concepts like 
instinct or insights. Instincts are the inbuilt fast biological reactions with which evolution has 
equipped us that maximize our chances of survival in the face of a physical threat – and which 
can’t be trained (Liebowitz, 2018). Additionally, insight is the capacity to gain an accurate and 
deep understanding of someone or something – deliberately (Liebowitz, 2018). Intuition is seen 




as the set of hunches, impulses, gut feelings, anticipations – and judgements stemming from 
previous events in your life.  It is viewed as the use of judgement based on experience to select 
pre-programmed solutions that are instantly available through pattern recognition (Hamm, 
2004). There is a strong case for pattern recognition when conflicting forces on decision 
synthesis cause mental gridlock. More complex expert schemas developed through an 
accumulation of experience may be more accurate and better suited to intuitive decision making 
and allowing a rapid recall of effective patterns that can be used in numerous situations across 
an expert’s domain (Hamm, 2004). However, an important aspect of discussing/defining 
intuition is that intuition, just as analysis, can be right or wrong (Hogarth, 2001). 
1.5. Research Objectives 
Cognitive psychology has pointed toward heuristics, such as scripts and other expert 
schemas as manifestations of expert intuition (Hamm, 2004). A script or a set of scripts, is a 
large set of situation patterns to recognize and rules of what to do within recognized patterns. 
The medical profession has made great strides in formalizing the training of how to achieve 
intuition and clinical wisdom in complex clinical problem solving (Hamm, 2004). By analyzing 
the difference between problem-solving methods of junior residents and acknowledged experts, 
they identify how the novices can faster and more efficiently reach the pattern recognition that 
characterizes the thorough process of master surgeons (Abernathy and Hamm,1994, 1995). This 
suggests that to promote the acquisition of intuition and expert competence, novices could be 
trained using scripts. This would teach them patterns – many patterns – along with the 
appropriate response in each pattern (Hamm, 2004). This technique looks a very pragmatic and 
practical way to develop expert intuition – but seems up to now to have been used only in the 
medical domain.  This research examined how to extend the script training concept to the 
domain of insurance underwriting. It looked to capture the scripts of experience underwriters; 
contrasted this with novices and then used this data to develop a training invention program for 
training intuition and then tested the impact of this training intervention. 




We also targeted in this research to uncover a better understanding deliberate 
judgements made in insurance underwriting through use of simple rules, or heuristics. As 
described above, most people use cognitive shortcuts such as scripts in routine situations. The 
problem with such tools is that they do not work well in complex, unprecedented cases – 
encountered frequently in underwriting decision making. Effective decision makers, go beyond 
the integrations represented by scripts and other cognitive shortcuts and develop simple rules 
that are based on the synthesis of knowledge gleaned from experience (Woiceshyn, 2009). 
Kruglanski, and Gigerenzer (2011) argue that intuitive and deliberative judgements can even 
both be based on exactly the same rules. The important question for research is what these rules 
are, when are they applied, and in which situations they are successful. Personal experience and 
lessons learnt from failures constitutes an important source of rule acquisition. An important 
factor in the selection of a rule is the ecological rationality of a rule for a given task (Kruglanski, 
and Gigerenzer, 2011).  
As described above, insurance underwriters in practice have to employ expert 
judgement to deal with many real-life uncertainties. Hence, the underwriting profession must 
also appreciate and strive to gain further insights into the nature and process of expert judgement 
needed for insurance underwriting. Given the apparent rigor in insurance / actuarial formal 
training, it is interesting to note that such an important skill like expert judgement  is not well 
understood and not covered in the training – but expected to be acquired through experience 
which could take many decades. A more formal understanding and training of expert judgement 
could greatly assist to accelerate the quality of insurance underwriting. If the acquisition of 
expert judgement in insurance underwriting is better understood and trainable, this could 
materially impact the way in which underwriters/actuaries are trained and practice. The aim of 
this research is also thus to look scientifically into the research question of whether training can 
help improve judgement and ultimately decision making in underwriting insurance risk using 
training techniques like scripts and simple rules applied to this field for the first time. 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The JDM Approach and Insurance Risk Underwriting Decisions  
2.1.1. Analytical Decision Making (ADM) and Insurance Risk Underwriting 
Underwriters, and especially actuaries, represent one of the most highly evolved 
practitioners of the scientific statistical and evidence-based approach. They are trained to build 
what can be excruciatingly complex models to use as the basis for decisions. These actuarial / 
statistical models rely upon a number of statistical laws for their power, such as the law of large 
numbers (Thoyts, 2010; Redja & McNamara, 2017) and Bayes’ theorem, the use of credibility 
theory, etc. In the hands of actuaries specifically, studies of mortality, motor accidents, etc., 
have all yielded to statistical analyses permitting the individual risks to be seen as sufficiently 
predictable that companies are prepared to accept them for a suitable premium. Centuries of 
insurance business have been based upon the notion that risk events become somewhat 
predictable when viewed in sufficient numbers (Law of Large Numbers). The ADM would 
encourage chosing from among alternative actions in the classical way in terms of the mean 
(expected value); variance (risk) and potential scenarios under the probability distributions over 
possible outcomes. 
Actuarial and more broadly statistical methods are ultimately a part of a rational decision 
making (ADM) process. In the ADM process a decision maker will identify potential solutions 
to a problem and then evaluate the characteristics of the outcomes under those solutions to find 
the optimal choice. Herbert Simon (1955) criticised rational models of decision making for 
ignoring situational and personal constraints such as time pressure and limited cognitive 
capacity. Simon’s own analyses of organisational decision making led him to propose that the 
mind had evolved short-cut strategies that delivered reasonable solutions to real-world problems 
– an idea know as bounded rationality. Such mental short cuts, or heuristics, could also lead to 
systematic errors.  




Underwriters and actuaries learn to optimise metrics like expected utility in their basic 
training (Bowers, 1997). Simon (1955) identified a major flaw in such ADM approaches. There 
is no natural limit to the analysis needed to reach the optimal conclusion. Simon suggested that 
ADM required “unbounded rationality” with potentially infinite data and infinite analysis. The 
unbounded rationality idea is easily seen in the frequent calls of underwriters and actuaries for 
more data and more time to complete the actuarial forecasts and analysis. Simon went on in his 
work to develop the idea of “satisficing” as a decision criterion instead of optimising with data 
analysis. “Satisficing” means concluding the decision process when a satisfactory outcome can 
be found from alternatives and requires judgement to select something “good enough”.  
Uncertainty is a defining characteristic of underwriting insurance risk. The insurance 
underwriter does not know all possible future outcomes with their consequences and 
probabilities. ADM models deal with situations of risk where outcomes and probabilities of 
outcomes are known – termed “risk” in economic terminology (Knight, 1921). Knight (1921) 
contrasts this with “uncertainty” with unknowable outcomes and probabilities. Also, according 
to the American Academy of Actuaries (AAA, 2014), the term risk is used in situations where 
the probabilities of possible outcomes are known or can be estimated with some degree of 
accuracy, whereas uncertainty is used in situations where such probabilities cannot be estimated 
– consistent with Knightian uncertainty. ADM models, like expected utility theory, cannot deal 
fully with real world uncertainty – and underwriters need to learn how to express and quantify 
the uncertainty in their predictions and decisions – and layer in expert judgement, both intuitive 
and deliberate, to cope with the uncertainty. Actuaries and underwriters have possibly been 
guilty of spending a disproportionate amount of time worrying about risk and not paying as 
much attention to uncertainty as we should have.  Uncertainty is the fact that future outcomes 
aren’t predictable just by looking at the past and are largely composed of risks that cannot be 
quantified or foreseen. Uncertainty is the fact that some risks are just not assessable and in fact 
may not even be known or knowable (e.g. Black Swan events, Taleb (2007)).  




As professionals, underwriters and actuaries are heavily reliant on data and statistical 
techniques as a means for making underwriting decisions. However, psychologist have shown 
(Klein, 1998) that only very inexperienced decision makers used only an ADM approach. 
Underwriting judgement is very much a critical element in underwriting assumption setting, 
forecasting and ultimately decision making. It is therefore important to understand how this 
intuitive and deliberate judgement works and to what extent our judgement may be 
compromised by the limitations associated with being human. These insights should also allow 
underwriters and actuaries to better communicate their findings to other decision makers in 
terms they can understand, as opposed to mathematical and modelling jargon that is specific 
especially to the actuarial profession. 
In psychology literature, “actuarial” judgement is seen as analogous to statistical 
judgement and has been in the middle of a heated debate on “clinical” versus “actuarial” 
judgement. Some seminal studies (Dawes, Faust and Meehl, 1989) claim that “actuarial” 
judgements are superior as they rely solely upon established relationships between data and 
outcomes whereas clinical judgements are made in the heads of clinicians and prone to error. 
This theme of a clash between models and experts relying on their judgement is developed 
further in Section 2.1.6. of this dissertation.  
 
2.1.2. Heuristics and Biases (HB) and Insurance Risk Underwriting 
A wide range of professions are investigating the consequences of behavioural 
limitations in human decision making. Given the ubiquity of intuition and judgement in the 
underwriting insurance risk, it is important for underwriters and actuaries to understand the 
potential biases inherent in human judgement and to learn methods and best practices to avoid 
them. Much of human judgement is based not on rational cognitive processes, but rather on 
heuristics – the unconscious “rules of thumb” that humans have developed over millennia to 
deal with our environment (Gigerenzer and Todd, 2000). And, although our ingrained and 




unconscious heuristics may have served us well in dealing with the dangers and opportunities 
faced by our ancestors, in today’s complex world, they can produce serious systematic errors, 
also known as biases. With a complex task like underwriting insurance risk, the limitations of 
human decision making are at their most vulnerable and cognitive biases are most influential. 
Daniel Kahneman (2011) coined the term “illusion of validity” to capture the truth that we, 
especially if we are “experts”, often harbour an illusion that we are good at intuition/judgement 
and decision making, when in fact we are not.  
While some work has been done to highlight the implications of heuristics and cognitive 
bias on insurance underwriting and actuarial work (Tredger et al, 2016), there is still a lack of 
awareness within the practicing body of underwriters and actuaries of these issues and the 
profession is yet to measure the extent to which they influence our day to day work. Awareness 
of such behavioural biases can help us understand the limitations of our forecasting and advice 
and the importance of how we present it. Following Tversky and Kahneman (1974), this section 
tackles some of the major heuristics that are employed to assess probabilities and to predict 
values and that are relevant to underwriting insurance risk. . 
Under the representativeness heuristic, underwriters/actuaries tend to make judgements 
based on small samples that are not statistically representative. Actuaries analyse the results of 
analysis of past actual experience, termed experience studies, to make forecasts for future 
experience. If the experience is based on a small sample, the results may not have validity to be 
used for forecasting. Actuaries have devised the concept of “credibility theory” (Herzog, 1999) 
to deal with this issue and offer partial credibility validity to samples based on size. Only large 
samples are given full credibility for forecasting.  
The availability heuristic causes people to think an event is more probable if it is easy to 
remember or if the memory is more vivid or those that trigger an emotional response (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974). Underwriters and actuaries sometimes make judgements based on data 
that is easily available, rather than finding appropriate data. This heuristic is especially relevant 




in setting premiums in the property and casualty (P&C) industry. For example, an underwriter 
considering the risk of a natural disaster or catastrophe, will be more likely to demand a higher 
premium when such an event has occurred recently – as opposed to taking the more rational 
statistical average. Prices also reduce after long periods of no disasters – and this pricing cycle 
regularly plays out in the catastrophe insurance markets.  This phenomenon is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1.2.1. below which shows how spikes in catastrophe premiums have followed actual 
major catastrophic events. 
 
Figure 2.1.2.1.  Relationship between Natural Disasters and Property Insurance Rates 
The anchoring heuristic (Kahneman, 2011) is the tendency to be over-reliant on a starting 
point when making an estimate for the future. Anchoring is one of the most relevant heuristics 
for underwriting insurance risk. Analysis has shown that underwriters are sometimes slow to 
react to new information in decision making. A theory as to why underwriters may be slow to 
react to new information is that they are anchored by their own prior assumptions and prices.  
The confirmation bias (Kahneman, 2011) is the tendency to interpret new information so 
that it becomes compatible with our existing theories, beliefs, and convictions. In other words, 
we filter out any new information that contradicts our existing views (“disconfirming 
evidence”). The confirmation bias is alive and well in the underwriting world. One example, an 
underwriter decides on accepting a new type of risk. The underwriter then enthusiastically 
celebrates any sign that the underwriting decision is a success. Everywhere the underwriter 




looks, he/she see plenty of confirming evidence, while indications to the contrary remain unseen 
or are quickly dismissed as “exceptions” or “special cases.” (Kahneman, 2011). 
Base-rate neglect is a fallacy where the detailed description entices us to overlook the 
statistical reality: a disregard of fundamental distribution levels. It is one of the most common 
errors in reasoning. Virtually all professions including underwriters fall prey to it on a regular 
basis. In medicine, base-rate neglect plays an important role. Doctors in training are advised to 
investigate the most likely ailments before you start diagnosing exotic diseases, even if they are 
a specialist in that area. Doctors are the only professionals who enjoy this base-rate training. 
Regrettably, few people in business are exposed to base-rate training (Kahneman, 2011).  
In cognitive psychology and decision science problems with belief updating (Bayes’ 
theorem) refers to the tendency to revise one's belief insufficiently when presented with new 
evidence. This bias describes human belief revision in which persons over-weigh the prior 
distribution and under-weigh new sample evidence when compared to Bayesian belief-
revision. In other words, persons update their prior beliefs as new evidence becomes available, 
but they do so more slowly than they would if they used Bayes' theorem (Dobelli, 2013). 
Tredger et al (2016) look into this question about the weight that should be attributed to the 
experience to date when blending judgement with data in an actuarial context. They have carried 
out an empirical experiment where actuaries were asked to update their best-estimate loss 
frequency prediction for a particular line of business. The aim of this experiment was to look 
for evidence as to whether actuaries exhibit bias in their judgement compared with the Bayesian 
estimates (Tredger et al, 2016). The experiment showed that without any form of training, the 
judgement used by an actuary when making predictions would typically show marked 
deviations from the Bayesian estimate. However, Tredger et al (2016) found evidence of an 
improvement in the quality of the responses provided by participants who had received some 
immediate training on biases and heuristics.  




Framing is the tendency for decisions to be influenced by the way an uncertain outcome is 
presented (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). Many times Kahneman and Tversky (1984) demon-
strated that opinions about an issue can be reversed if the issue is simply presented in a way that 
is logically equivalent, but expressed differently. Underwriters provide professional advice to 
help individuals/corporates make decisions on uncertain outcomes. While we would like to 
think that the individuals who use our advice do so rationally, the framing effect suggests 
otherwise. One plausible explanation for why the framing effect occurs is prospect theory. 
Prospect theory says that if the forecast outcome is viewed as a gain, an individual will be risk 
averse in their decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). However, if the outcome is 
viewed as a loss, prospect theory says that the individual’s decision making will be risk-seeking. 
The implication of this is that an individual’s decisions can change depending on whether the 
forecast outcome is framed as a gain or as a loss. To avoid the framing bias, underwriters and 
actuaries need to present the result of their analysis in multiple ways. There is also the power 
of incentives that could impact underwriting decisions. In practice underwriter’s decisions are 
particularly affected by the way their attention is focused on critical performance targets (March 
and Shapira, 1987). This could result in them being less sensitive to estimates of the 
probabilities of possible outcomes when making business decisions.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that even people who are statistically sophisticated, 
like underwriters / actuaries, are not always good at judging probabilities. When asked for the 
probability that their prediction of some future event will come true, people, especially experts, 
systematically seem to report a probability that is far too high. This bias could have very serious 
implications for insurance underwriting decision making. There is also evidence of 
overconfidence and the “illusion of control” from models in the insurance industry. However, 
there is a growing body of empirical evidence (Makridakis, 1990) showing that accurate long-
term forecasting in the finance world is usually not possible. In addition, there is huge 
uncertainty, as practically all economic and business activities are subject to events we are 




unable to predict. The fact that forecasts can be inaccurate creates a serious dilemma for 
insurance underwriters. Hence, there is a strong need for intuition and judgement to cope with 
this residual uncertainty. 
To guard against our inherent biases that could lead to poor underwriting decisions, 
there is much that actuaries and underwriters can do. Firstly, awareness is a crucial element in 
mitigation of bias (Kahneman, 2011). The data hungry nature of the underwriting / actuarial 
professions helps reduce exposure to cognitive bias. Actuarial work in particular is in most 
cases guided by professional and/or regulatory standards that force the underwriter / actuary to 
justify their assumptions and can be an important control for reducing cognitive bias in our 
work. The education pathway to become a professional actuary is comprehensive and 
demanding and requires adherence to continuous professional development standards. Peer 
review of actuaries’ judgements provide an independent assessment of the quality of the 
judgement. Checklists could be useful to the actuary with a list of factors relevant to the 
forecasting task and prevent them from being influenced by extraneous information (Gawande, 
2011). Finally,  insurance forecasts should not be overconfident and use confidence intervals, 
rather than point predictions, and also provide various stress tests and scenario forecasts. 
While judgement can play a valuable role in insurance underwriting, it can also be 
subject to biases and inconsistencies (noise) arising from cognitive limitations, political 
influences or confusion between forecasts, targets and decisions. Cognitive limitations, in 
particular, have been the focus of a large body of research which has been concerned with 
identifying their effects on forecast accuracy. Kahneman (2011) and Kahneman and Tversky 
(1973) examine the  psychology of prediction – looking at judgemental heuristics and biases. 
Signal detection theory (Heeger, 1997) provides a good framework for further 
understanding why underwriters may be more inclined to “DECLINE” a case rather than 
“ACCEPT” under conditions of uncertainty. The starting point for signal detection theory is 
that nearly all reasoning and decision making takes place in the presence of some uncertainty 




(Heeger, 1997). Signal detection theory provides a precise language and graphic notation for 
analyzing decision making in the presence of uncertainty (Heeger, 1997).  Figure 2.1.2.2. shows 
the 4 possible outcomes of an underwriting decision at time T1 and the outcome at time T2:  
  T1  
  Accept Decline 
T2 Success Hit✓ Miss 
Failure False Accept Correct Rejection✓ 
Figure 2.1.2.2.  Forced Choice : 4 possible outcomes 
If an underwriting case is accepted and it proves to be loss making (a false accept – failing to 
detect a loss making case) there could be negative consequences for the underwriter – which 
could weigh heavily on their decision making. If there is a penalty for a false accept, this may 
influence underwriters to more easily reject cases. Further, a “miss” would be to reject a profit 
making case, falsely thinking it would be a loss.   However, the company may not know about 
cases which the underwriter rejects that turn out to be a success  – as the case does not enter the 
company accounts.  Hence, this framework shows that underwriters may be more inclined to 
reject cases under uncertainty given the consequences of a “false accept” versus a “miss”. 
 
2.1.3. Fast and Frugal Heuristics (FFH) and Insurance Underwriting Risk  
The term heuristic is of Greek origin, meaning ‘‘serving to find out or 
discover’’(Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009).  Heuristics do not always lead to bias and may be 
advantageous in certain circumstances. Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2009) examine the topic of 
fast and frugal forecasting using heuristics. The previous section on HB focused on heuristics 
leading to systematic errors or biases. There is another school of thought which portrays 
heuristics in a more positive light. The basic premise of the fast and frugal heuristic (FFH) 
school is that much of human decision making and reasoning can be explained in terms of 
simple heuristics that operate within the limits of time, knowledge, and computation imposed 
on the individual (Gigerenzer and Todd, 2000). A FFH approach is a way to solve problems 




quickly with incomplete information. A successful application of a heuristic is governed by its 
ecological rationality – i.e. the match of a heuristic with a given environment. FFH models can 
be both descriptive and prescriptive (Gigerenzer and Todd, 2000). Forecasts in highly uncertain 
domains, like insurance of certain new types of risks can sometimes be,  are more likely to be 
based on rules of thumb than the extensive analysis of all available data. 
FFH do not compute quantitative probabilities or utilities, as in classical decision 
making models used in statistical forecasting of ADM, because these values require too much 
computation to serve as practical bases for forecasting and often require knowledge that is 
unavailable in real-world tasks (Gigerenzer and Todd, 2000). The aim of the FFH approach is 
to develop models of cognition that are simultaneously plausible on psychological and 
ecological grounds, as well as being computationally specific (Slegers, Brake and Doherty, 
2000). These are computationally simple and require less information than ADM models. 
When making forecasts and underwriting decisions, constant tension exists between 
model builders and heuristic proponents. However, both approaches have at their core a 
Bayesian view of how to derive the right decision, which is constantly updating your decision-
making engine with new experiences. Bayesian uses Bayes' theorem to update the probability 
for a hypothesis as more evidence or information becomes available. The heuristic forecasters 
may cast a wider net for information to bring into their heuristic. The statistical forecast 
modellers are usually limited to specifically quantifiable information that can be put into their 
models. Since the heuristic group does not have a quantitative forecasting model, they do not 
have that constraint. However, their disadvantage is that they do not necessarily include a 
systematic way to incorporate new information into their forecasts.  
The heuristic forming process is not necessarily a fully conscious process. In fact, 
explanations of heuristics are usually post hoc. This issue does not diminish the importance of 
heuristics. The traditional actuarial or statistical approach is a development of the scientific 
revolution, through the use of regular observation. Only a few hundred years have gone into 




perfecting this approach, not the thousands of years that support human heuristic processes 
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 2000). Some of these heuristics can be readily explained to colleagues 
in the business forecasting process, but some cannot be put into words any better than explaining 
incredible sporting feats like a baseball player hitting a fastball (Gigerenzer and Todd, 2000). 
Such heuristics are called “gut instinct.” The ability of experts to make judgements in this arena 
is usually honed by decades of experience – but we will discuss experts further in the next 
section.   
The adaptive toolbox is the repertoire of heuristics available to decision makers and 
forecasters to use in different circumstances (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). Underwriters and 
actuaries have their own adaptive toolbox of satisficing and heuristic short cuts in making 
actuarial forecasts and underwriting decisions. Underwriters and actuaries tend not to maximize 
expected utility, as taught in actuarial theory (Bowers, 1997), but instead find it easier to 
maximize expected profits from among possibilities with acceptable downside potential. 
Tallying (Gigerenzer and Todd, 2000) can be used to assign equal weights to different 
forecasting outcomes. With lexicographic strategies, the underwriter will base the forecast on 
the most important factor or cue such as the type of product or alignment of interest on risk. 
The affect heuristics can be used by underwriters to make risk decisions by feelings or emotions 
– and view risk as a feeling (Slovic, 2010). There are also various decision and stopping rules 
that could be used based on size / materiality of the business deal being forecast; probable 
maximum loss (PML); whether the contract can be revised in future; etc. The underwriter could 
also choose to ignore immaterial phenomena that are difficult to model (e.g. remote contract 
options). The recognition heuristic would be used by experienced underwriters and under the 
similarity heuristic underwriters and actuaries can draw on actions from a similar forecast from 
the past.  
 
 




2.1.4. Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and Insurance Risk Underwriting 
Underwriters and actuaries are experts who have highly organized, domain-specific 
knowledge that allows them to encode complex insurance and financial information. This expert 
knowledge results in faster and more accurate underwriting  decisions. Psychologist Gary 
Klein, in his book Sources of Power (Klein, 1998), describes studies of how experts make 
decisions – which he terms naturalistic decision making (NDM). Underwriters through 
extensive training and experience are experts in insurance risk management decisions. NDM is 
primarily a descriptive approach that seeks to explain human decision making in terms of expert 
performance (Klein, 1998). No attempt is made to define normative decision rules because such 
normative models are generally unable to adequately explain the actions of human decision 
makers (Gigerenzer, 1997). NDM addresses how human decision makers can deal with real 
constraints of time, information and high stress. In general, NDM theories are consistent with 
expert decision making but tend to be very general, referring to broad categories of cognitive 
processes such as recognition, pattern matching, and mental simulation − without explaining 
exactly how these processes are performed. In insurance underwriting, experienced 
underwriters often use such recognition, pattern matching and mental simulation techniques. 
NDM is not at all similar to ADM discussed earlier. NDM is a correspondence theory 
interested in the way the world works and more positive about experts and judgemental 
forecasting.  ADM and HB are coherence theories interested in the way mind works in relation 
to the way it ought to work. NDM also differs from FFH. NDM models are derived from expert 
behaviour but FFH from an analysis of the task or problem in its environmental context. NDM 
was developed to study real-world decision making in complex tasks, whereas the FFH 
approach has explored traditional, lab-based tasks which are much simpler and easy to describe. 
Perhaps because NDM models are, for the most part, created from accounts of experts like 
underwriters and actuaries, these models generally emphasize memory-based processes. FFH 
can make use of such processes but are not limited to them and not dependent on experience. 




In studying how highly experienced people make decisions, Klein (1998) discovered 
that they do not typically use a rational slow process. Their natural process is to study the 
problem against one solution quickly selected from their mental library, which has been 
constructed over many years of experience. Such an approach works well for senior 
underwriters and actuaries who must make decisions quickly — especially when not all of the 
forecasting variables can readily be quantified, and when there is no single, precise model for 
the exact relationships among them. NDM techniques commonly used in underwriting 
insurance are discussed below.  
Klein (1998) has described intuitive decision making as a pattern-recognition process: 
cues about the decision situation lead a decision maker to recognize a familiar pattern (based 
on prior experience) which then activates an action script, a routine way of responding that 
makes deliberate analysis unnecessary. Although he does not deny the value of rational analysis, 
Klein argues that reliance on intuition leads to more effective (faster, more accurate) decisions. 
As reported by Klein (1998), people with more experience are often perceived as having more 
or better intuitions In a review of the literature, Klein (1998) identified four key ways in which 
experts learn: firstly, engaging in deliberate practice, and setting specific goals and evaluation 
criteria; secondly, compiling extensive experience banks; thirdly, obtaining feedback that is 
accurate, diagnostic, and reasonably timely; and finally, enriching their experiences by 
reviewing prior experiences to derive new insights and lessons from mistakes. This is totally 
congruent with the methodology used in cognitive decision scripts training. 
According to the complex recognition primed decision (RPD) model (Klein 1993), 
expert underwriters would first appraise the situation in order to classify it as familiar or not, 
based on their experience. The assessment of familiarity can be made by matching features of 
the forecast to prior forecasts, recognition of a whole pattern of features that fits a familiar story 
or scenario, or explicit recall of an analogy from another similar or related domain. This 




recognition concept is analogous to the concept of intuition. In the famous words of Hebert 
Simon: "Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition." (Kahneman, 2011). 
When the underwriter / actuary is unable to recognize a given situation, the typical 
reaction is to seek more data and information or to resolve the ambiguous situation through 
diagnostic processes such as “story building” (Klein, 1998). With this the underwriter creates a 
detailed hypothesis or story that could explain the situation. Whatever the outcome of an 
underwriting decision, the underwriter’s clients and superiors need a story to buy into it. A 
convincing story that explains projected results and decision and renders them plausible is 
important. In fact, it is often seen by some as more vital than the forecast itself. This helps the 
underwriter / actuary put the results into a commercial context.  
Once the underwriter / actuary has diagnosed the situation, he or she can use mental 
simulation (Klein, 1998) to form expectations about future results and test the working 
hypothesis. If there are many inconsistencies between the hypothesis and the situation, the 
underwriter must revise his or her hypothesis. As underwriters proceed with mental simulation, 
they can also generate different possible actions. These scenarios are then tested by mental 
simulation for their likely consequences. Underwriters / actuaries are numerate and at ease 
doing exercises like mental simulations.  
 
2.1.5. Conditions for Intuitive Expertise in Insurance Risk Underwriting 
Reliance on intuition does not always result in high-quality decisions and suggests that 
particular conditions are more conducive for the use of intuition than rational analysis. The 
determination of whether intuitive judgements can be trusted requires an examination of the 
environment in which the judgement is made and of the opportunity that the judge has had to 
learn the regularities of that environment (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Kahneman and Klein 
(2009) describe task environments as “high-validity” if there are stable relationships between 
objectively identifiable cues and subsequent events or between cues and the outcomes of 




possible actions. They cite medicine and firefighting as professions that are practiced in 
environments of fairly high validity. In contrast, outcomes are effectively unpredictable in zero-
validity environments. The authors cite the future value of individual stocks and long-term 
forecasts of political events as being made in a zero-validity environment. Kahneman and Klein 
(2009) state that an environment of high validity is a necessary condition for the development 
of skilled intuitions and that other necessary conditions include adequate opportunities for 
learning the environment (prolonged practice and feedback that is both rapid and unequivocal). 
Kahneman and Klein (2009) conclude that if an environment provides valid cues and good 
feedback, skill and expert intuition will eventually develop in individuals of sufficient talent. 
High-validity environments, like insurance markets, are uncertain but expert-judgment 
can identify good bets. Determining the validity of an environment is not always easy. Insurance 
markets are high validity environments as there are certain rules or principles to follow for 
success. There are however many complex and volatile environments such as the stock market 
or the political arena that are not of high validity. The inability of investment fund managers to 
consistently beat the market underscores this argument. According to Tetlock (2015), long-term 
political forecasting is doomed to fail as large-scale political developments are too complex to 
be forecast. The task of prediction is simply impossible in a low validity environment.  
Hogarth (2001), in a similar vein to Kahneman & Klein, also stresses the point that 
expert judgment is only accurate in specific environments. Hogarth (2001) describes two types 
of environments: Firstly, “kind” learning environments where the information in the learning 
environment closely matches the situation in which the decision is to be made and the  
environments provide useful feedback to the decision maker. This contrasts with so called 
“wicked” learning environments where  there are mismatches between the information in the 
learning environment and the decision situation, which are likely to lead to mistakes in decision 
making and the feedback is misleading or missing Hogarth (2001). Daniel Kahneman and Gary 
Klein refer to kind learning environments as environments with high validity.    




Hogarth (2001) also underscores that kind learning environments are a necessary 
condition for accurate intuitive judgments, whereas intuitions acquired in wicked environments 
are likely to be mistaken. Intuition can be the result of expertise and skill or of self-deception 
through heuristics and cognitive biases. Intuitive decisions work very well in specific 
environments and situations. People make intuitive judgments based on recognition of cues and 
pattern matching. Decision makers must regularly practice their decision-making skills to 
recognize the available signals and also need accurate feedback on the quality of their decisions.  
Kahneman and Klein (2009) state that within a profession like medicine, some 
specialties provide better and faster learning opportunities than others – e.g. anesthesiologists 
benefit from good feedback, because the effects of their actions are likely to be quickly evident 
and in contrast, radiologists obtain little information about the accuracy of the diagnoses and 
hence anesthesiologists are therefore in a better position to develop useful intuitive skills. This 
variation in intuitive skills could also apply to the underwriters making shorter term forecasts 
(e.g. property and casualty underwriters looking at one-year horizon) get greater frequency of 
forecasting feedback accuracy than life insurance or pension actuaries and underwriters (who 
may have to wait decades for their forecasts to be fully evaluated).  Kahneman (Kahneman and 
Klein, 2009) drives this point about learning home with his conclusion that “Whether 
professionals have a chance to develop intuitive expertise depends essentially on the quality 
and speed of feedback, as well as on sufficient opportunity to practice.”  
With this background, we can now see two main reasons why algorithms beat people. 
The first is that, as Kahneman (Kahneman and Klein, 2009) writes, “Statistical algorithms 
greatly outdo humans in noisy environments for two reasons: they are more likely than human 
judges to detect weakly valid cues and much more likely to maintain a modest level of accuracy 
by using such cues consistently.” In other words, people often miss cues (i.e. data) in the 
environment that would be useful to them, and even when they are aware of such cues they 
don’t use them the same way every time. In other words, the fact that most real-world 




environments are messy and noisy does not favor human experts over algorithms. The second 
reason is that fast, accurate feedback is not always available to a human expert – e.g. an 
interviewer won’t always get the feedback that the person he hired flamed out on the job two 
years down the road. But well-designed algorithms can and do incorporate feedback and results 
over a long time frame, which helps explains why algorithmic approaches to pathology and 
talent management work so much better (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). 
Intuition is something that can be honed through experiential learning and techniques to 
further stimulate one’s intuitive sense, like scripts and simple rules training. This form of 
training also integrates with the three main conditions for development of intuitive expertise 
discussed in this section viz.:  a regular environment; feedback and many opportunities to 
practice. 
 
2.1.6. Combining Models and Judgement in Underwriting Insurance Risk 
As mentioned earlier, there has been a long running debate on actuarial/statistical vs. 
clinical predictions in psychology (Dawes et al, 1989). Clinical judgement is thought to be 
inferior to judgement based on actuarial / statistical models in a clinical setting. However true 
underwriting in insurance or finance practice, not that referenced in psychology literature, is a 
blend of both statistical and clinical modes of thinking. Experienced underwriters / actuaries 
know that the most effective and most characteristically ‘actuarial’ way of thinking involves a 
subtle melding of clinical (professional judgement) and statistical (financial models) ways of 
thinking (Ingram, 2012). Whenever experts have valid intuition, model-expert combinations 
will be more accurate than either of the single inputs (Bunn and Wright , 1991). 
Most researchers have concluded that decision makers combine judgement and rational 
analysis. Accurate underwriting requires the proper integration of both modes of thought.  
According to Cognitive Continuum Theory (Hammond, 1996, 2000), there are multiple modes 
of cognition that lie on a continuum between intuition and analysis. Cognitive (managerial) 




tasks vary in their ability to induce intuition, quasi-rationality (i.e., the combination of intuitive 
and analytic thought) or analysis, and performance is contingent on the correspondence between 
task properties and cognitive mode. Bunn and Wright (1991) in their seminal paper look at the 
interaction of judgemental and statistical forecasting methods stating all serious forecasts 
require the exercise of some judgement and that a well-structured judgemental process can 
consistently outperform a statistical model-based extrapolation. They stress the importance of 
making the judgemental process explicit through a form of decomposition or audit trails  
Insurance / actuarial  forecasting can be performed in three main ways viz. using models 
based only on statistical forecasting; using models based only on judgemental forecasting 
(expert judgement) or using a combination of these two methods – termed combined forecasting 
(Armstrong, 2002). The general forecasting literature states that combined forecasting models 
have higher forecast accuracy than models based only on statistical forecasting or models based 
only on judgemental forecasting (Blattberg and Hoch, 1990); (Hoch, 2007) and (Lawrence et 
al, 1986). This relationship should also be true for underwriting / actuarial forecasting needed 
for making insurance underwriting decisions.  In a study of expert highway engineers' use of 
analytical, quasi-rational (i.e., the combination of intuitive and analytic thought), and intuitive 
cognition, Hammond and Hamm et al (1987) show that  intuitive and quasi-rational cognition 
frequently outperformed analytical cognition. This shows the importance of judgement in a 
seemingly quantitative domain like engineering.  
Models and experts have complementary skills. Models combine complex data in a 
consistent and unbiased manner. That doesn’t necessary mean that the maximum accuracy in 
models is higher – underscoring the difference between maximal and average accuracy. 
Statistical analysis can produce predictive value because the number of potentially important 
variables in actuarial forecasting is much larger than can be dealt with by simple heuristics. 
However, judgemental forecasting from experts can factor in additional insights that the pure 
statistical model cannot incorporate, such as customer behaviour in an insurance context. 




Hence, combining models and experts for actuarial forecasting and underwriting should be 
more accurate as they combine the complementary skills of statistical and judgemental 
forecasts. In practice, there should be an optimal level of how much judgemental forecasting is 
factored in and how the integration is done to bring into underwriting decisions.  
 
2.2. The Cognitive Psychology Approach and Insurance Risk Underwriting Decisions 
2.2.1. Scripts 
The general model from cognitive psychology, represented by the script metaphor 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977), offers a powerful descriptive framework which in combination 
with decision theory’s normative framework, promises new progress for attempts to improve 
underwriting decision making. Descriptive models focus on how people make their decisions 
in their everyday lives, normative models focus on how perfectly rational agents should make 
decisions. The dominant view in cognitive science is that decision makers are guided by their 
“knowledge structures” consisting of heuristics, scripts or schemas. Knowledge structures are 
mental templates or cognitive filters that individuals use to interpret their information 
environment. Over time, knowledge structures become cognitive shortcuts: they allow quick 
behavioral responses in familiar situations, based on a “script” developed from previous 
experience. For example, experienced drivers in colder climates have developed scripts for 
driving in icy conditions – scripts that novice drivers or those in warmer regions do not possess. 
Scripts have regularly been used in medical psychology to refer to complex mental 
representations that are used by the experienced physician in making a decision about a patient 
(Abernathy and Hamm, 1994, 1995). Abernathy and Hamm (1994, 1995) suggest 
supplementing the formal training of medical students and younger surgeons with surgical 
scripts taken from real cases involving experienced expert surgeons to acquire better intuition. 
They argue that much of the intuitive expertise of surgeons lies in the mental scripts that they 
have developed for dealing with cases. In other words, when confronted with a patient, 




experienced surgeons are able to construct stories about how certain kinds of actions are likely 
to lead to specific outcomes, what to do depending on how events unfold, and so on. As experts, 
these surgeons reason by assessing the present states of their patients and imagining future 
sequences of actions and events (Abernathy and Hamm, 1994, 1995). 
In Abernathy and Hamm (1994, 1995) the scripts take the form of recordings (presented 
in written format) of the verbalized thoughts of experienced surgeons who are asked to think 
aloud as they examine and contemplate different cases. Abernathy and Hamm (1994, 1995) 
argue that such scripts allow novices to walk through cases with experienced professionals, 
benefiting from their experience and tacitly acquiring their intuitions. The concept of 
professional scripts is interesting and if generalized, it suggests a way of providing the benefits 
of mentorship and apprenticeship, but in a much more condensed form – allowing novices to 
learn much more than they would in the course of a standard apprenticeship (Hogarth, 2001).  
It should be emphasized that professional scripts are quite different from the case studies 
that are so popular in business schools (Hogarth, 2001). The case-study method has students 
discuss and debate situations taken from the real business world. They are then asked to 
recommend a decision and elaborate a rationale, and the professor uses the discussion to 
emphasize different conceptual points. In many cases, there is no right answer. A script version 
of the business case study would be quite different. Students would engage in little debate. 
Instead, they would study expert analyses made by experienced members of the business 
community – possibly guided by a professor. As it is typically used by business schools, the 
case study is not a way to build good intuitions for solving business problems. There is no clear 
criterion that distinguishes good from bad decisions (Hogarth, 2001). The experience is 
superficial, and it offers little chance to learn from expert practitioners – leading to major recent 
criticism of MBA programs using cases studies (Mintzberg, 2004). The script training addresses 
these negatives. 




Judgement and decision making (JDM) has also not made sufficient use of the key 
concepts from cognitive psychology concerning the representation and utilization of knowledge 
(Hamm 2004). At the same time, it is well known that the approach is grounded in cognitive 
psychological theory. Although the role of complex, automated knowledge structures i.e. scripts 
has received little attention in JDM research, the field has worked with many of its components. 
The expert in NDM does not deliberate about probabilities and utilities to decide which 
alternative is best. Nor does the expert quickly and intuitively process the probabilities and 
utilities, using heuristic strategies. Rather, the decision to crack the problem is built into the 
knowledge structure that has been activated; in most cases, the action is taken without any 
activation of decision theoretic concepts (Hamm et al., 2000). Most decisions experienced 
professionals make are routine – they gather information, recognize the problem as a familiar 
one and treat it in the usual way – consistent with the script concept. 
The script framework incorporates the elements of associative memory, recognition, 
complex memory structures, rules, operations, search, etc. under a variety of names, to account 
for experts’ use of knowledge in applied situations (Hamm, 2004). The term “script” is used to 
refer to the expert knowledge characterized by this approach. This was one of the concepts used 
by Schank and Abelson (1977) to describe how ambiguous sentences about everyday situations 
are understood through the listener’s knowledge of such situations. The script is a statement 
describing how the professional makes the decision – understand the situation, considers 
responses for that sort of situation that are stored in memory, makes decisions and plans, and 
then carries them out (Hamm 2004). Professionals may not be fully aware of the scripts they 
use or of the strategies that are embodied in their scripts, particularly when their knowledge has 
been developed through extensive experience (Abernathy and Hamm, 1995). Scripts are 
ultimately knowledge organized into structures that hold everything one needs to know about a 
type of situation and that come to mind in an instant of recognition – and enables experts to take 
advantage of the mind's strengths so that they can handle tasks in their domain of expertise. 




Another element of expert reasoning that is essential to the decision-script concept, but 
that cannot be called part of a decision script per se, is reflection (Hamm, 2004). This is involved 
in monitoring whether the current understanding of the situation is adequate, and in judging 
whether one of  the script’s options is likely to be effective in the situation. This reflection helps 
the professional become aware of the need to make changes in the approach to the current 
situation, and provides the conditions for the development of new scripts.  
The script concept stems directly from cognitive psychology (Schank and Abelson, 
1977). In addition, scripts of both novices and experts can also be analyzed using a Judgement 
and Decision Making (JDM) lens (see Appendix I) – incorporating analytical decision making 
(ADM); heuristics and biases (HB); fast and frugal heuristics (FFH) and naturistic decision 
making (NDM). JDM and cognitive psychology frameworks do somewhat overlap on the 
scripts concept – a characterization in terms of scripts is similar to recognition primed decisions 
(RPD) (Klein, 1993); case-based reasoning (Riesbeck and Schank, 1989);  or rule-based 
reasoning (Anderson, 1990, 1993) –  all as part of the same big picture concept (Hamm, 2004). 
Integrity of Underwriter Scripts : The integrity of scripts was ensured using the two 
approaches of correspondence and coherence/consistency (Hammond, 2000). Correspondence 
is based on performance in the real world and examines the accuracy of predicting or judging 
empirical events. The goal of correspondence meta-theory is to describe and explain the process 
by which a person’s judgements achieve empirical accuracy. Correspondence translates to 
accuracy. Correspondence theory also focuses on the empirical accuracy of judgments, 
irrespective of whether the cognitive activity of the judge can be justified or even described 
(Hammond, 2000). The performance of senior underwriter’s scripts follows correspondence.  
In contrast, coherence/consistency criteria are those that are based on normative 
standards of logic (or some other formal model). The goal of coherence meta-theory is to 
describe and explain the process by which a person’s judgement achieves logical, mathematical 
or statistical rationality. Coherence translates into rationality and logic. It would takes very 




strong empirical contradiction to overturn a highly coherent theory in which a great deal has 
been invested on the assumption that it is true. The simple rules incorporated into the training 
programme in this study falls within the scope of coherence.  
Hence, another strength of a combined scripts and simple rules is that it covers both a 
correspondence and coherence view of the underwriting world. 
Range of Underwriter Scripts : An interesting training design question is whether the 
scripts used for training should cover a wider or narrow range of situations or products? For 
example, when training underwriters in a specialized area like Life business,  should they be 
exposed to situations outside the core Life area – like Property & Casualty? Training using a 
wider range of cases will give younger underwriters the benefits of breadth and diverse 
experience and the interdisciplinary thinking that comes with that. Training gives underwriters 
the power of range which they may not get in their daily jobs in an hyperspecialized world. 
Modern job descriptions and professional incentives are aligning to accelerate specialization, 
creating intellectual archipelagos (Epstein, 2019). The exposure to a wide breadth of experience 
is invaluable in extracting the scripts and simple rules to have the ability to apply knowledge to 
new situations and different domains (Epstein, 2019). 
2.2.2. Rule-Based Reasoning  
The script concept is similar to other concepts in cognitive psychology like rule-based 
reasoning (Anderson, 1990, 1993).  This is a framework for skill acquisition that theorizes two 
major stages in the development of a cognitive skill: a declarative stage in which facts about 
the skill domain are interpreted (e.g. don’t cover non-random risks) and a procedural stage in 
which the domain knowledge is directly embodied in procedures for performing the skill (e.g. 
risk-return tradeoff). Experts have extensive and highly organized knowledge. The knowledge 
underlying a skill begins in an initial declarative form to produce performance. As a function 
of its interpretive execution, this skill becomes compiled into a production-rule form. With 
practice, individual production rules acquire strength and become more attuned to the 




circumstances in which they apply. This allows experts to think fast and to think complicated 
thoughts without hindrance by the limited capacity of short term memory. This general 
framework has been instantiated in the “ACT” (Adaptive Control of Thought) system 
(Anderson, 1990, 1993) in which facts are encoded in a propositional network and procedures 
are encoded as productions. Propositional representations (Kintsch, 1988) is a knowledge 
representation theory, similar to scripts, where reasoning is achieved through propositional 
calculus (Boole, 1854). A propositional network  represents knowledge as simple idea units, 
represented by two nodes and a link (Kintsch, 1988). Productions represent knowledge about 
how we do things. Probably the most extensive use of such componential analysis is for 
intelligent tutoring systems such as computer tutors having been developed for training high 
school students in mathematics (Anderson, 1990, 1993). Programs make models of each 
student’s problem-solving scripts and then identify incorrect rules the student uses which need 
to be changed.  
2.2.3. Deliberate Practice 
Traditionally, professional expertise has been judged by length of experience, 
reputation, and perceived mastery of knowledge and skill. Ericsson and Charness (2002) are 
careful to note, that not all practice leads to the development of expertise. In fact, observed 
performance does not necessarily correlate with greater professional experience. Expert 
performance can, however, be traced to active engagement in deliberate practice, where training 
is focused on improving particular tasks. Deliberate practice also involves the provision of 
immediate feedback, time for problem-solving and evaluation, and opportunities for repeated 
performance to refine behavior where deviations exist to focus on eliminating these points of 
discrepancy (Ericsson and Charness, 2002).  This concept is consistent with the procedures and 
goals of scripts and simple rules-based training – which incorporates repeated exposure to 
expert scripts. Talent almost certainly plays some role but all the evidence indicates that genius 
is mainly perspiration that inspiration (Ericsson and Charness, 2002).    




2.3. Simple Rules from Strategy and Insurance Risk Underwriting 
Executives, including actuaries and underwriters, approach unpredictable situations as 
problem solvers (Simon, 1973). They develop a few simple rules / heuristics that fit available 
information (which is often spotty) and attention (which is often brief), but still provide 
workable solutions that are amenable to improvement. Bingham and Eisenhardt (2014) 
advocate that heuristics, are the essence of strategy, especially in unpredictable markets where 
opportunities are often numerous, fast moving, and uncertain (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2008). 
Heuristics create structure thereby providing efficiency in the capture of opportunities, and yet 
also enable flexibility to improvise for unique features of particular opportunities.  
Bingham and Eisenhardt (2014) compare the simple rules heuristics approach with 
“heuristics-and-biases” and “fast-and-frugal” heuristics research. Heuristics-and-biases focuses 
on universal heuristics  that are automatically invoked and can lead to biased processes. 
Similarly, fast-and-frugal centers on universal heuristics that are automatic, but that also exploit 
the environment to achieve accurate predictions. Simple rules are idiosyncratic heuristics that 
are often consciously understood, combined with improvisation, and can constitute strategy 
especially in high-velocity environments where opportunities are superabundant, 
heterogeneous, and fast moving. Collectively, the three approaches offer a rich understanding 
of heuristics. 
Simple rules heuristics have a common structure across processes that fits the goal of 
effectively capturing heterogeneous opportunities (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011). Bingham 
and Eisenhardt (2011) define selection heuristics as deliberate rules of thumb for guiding which 
sets of product or market opportunities to pursue (and which to ignore). An example of a 
selection heuristics in the insurance underwriting context could be “select only insurance risks 
where the insurance event is random risks”. Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) also define 
procedural heuristics as deliberate rules of thumb for guiding the execution of a selected 




opportunity. An example of a procedural heuristics in the insurance underwriting context could 
be “ensure that interests an aligned between the insurer and client”. 
Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) indicate that firms learn heuristics that have a common 
structure centered on opportunity capture and are learned in a specific developmental order. 
This results in a deliberately small, yet increasingly strategic, portfolio of heuristics. The 
learning literature indicates that firms learn processes from experience (Argote, 2002).  
Bingham and Haleblian (2012) explore how firms learn heuristics from negative outcomes. 
Learning occurs as organizational members: (1) make attributions for negative outcome events; 
(2) communicate those attributions to others across the firm hierarchy through communication 
that is rhythmic, multi-hierarchical, and occurring within a fixed amount of time; and (3) arrive 
at convergent attributions for outcomes such that firm level heuristics can be created to prevent 
negative outcomes from reoccurring in the future. Prior literature has suggested that learning is 
strongly affected by whether attributions for negative outcomes are internal or external.  
Every day, underwriters are faced with a blizzard of situations they must respond to. 
Without simple rules they would be forced to react to cases, as if we were experiencing each of 
them for the first time (Sull & Eisenhardt, 2016). If instead we classify these situations into types 
and have simple rules for dealing with them, we will make better decisions more quickly and 
have better results.  Having a good set of simple rules is like having a good collection of recipes 
for success (Sull & Eisenhardt, 2016). Unfortunately, most professionals don’t do that and it’s 
very rare for people to write their simple down and share them. Simple rules improve 
performance by narrowing problem scope to more similar situations (efficiency) while leaving 
room to improvise specifics (flexibility) (Sull & Eisenhardt, 2016). They are easy to remember, 
communicate, and update; and can be surprisingly effective when experience is limited. This 
research aims to distill the key insurance underwriting simple rules (see Appendix II) used in 
the insurance industry. Rules can be refined as one encounters more experiences and to reflect 
on them, which will help one make better decisions. 




CHAPTER 3: TRAINING DESIGN AND DEVELOPMEMNT OF THE HYPOTHESES  
 
In this chapter we detail the design of the training intervention constructed for this study and 
also develop the hypotheses to be tested. 
3.1 Introduction to Design of the Training 
The training design has been uniquely designed for this present study. The detailed 
components of the training design are discussed in the sections in this chapter. In summary, our 
research extends the script training concept, used extensively in medical training, to the domain 
of insurance underwriting for the first time. As part of the research, we interviewed underwriters 
of varying levels of experience. We looked to capture the scripts of experienced underwriters; 
contrast this with novices and then use these as a training tool for underwriters. We then also 
looked to extract the simple rules that underlie the expert intuitive judgements in insurance 
underwriting and use these to formally train more deliberate judgements. The training 
intervention was administered to groups of professional underwriters and also groups of 
students. The impact of the training was measured for both accuracy and consistency 
improvements in underwriting decisions. Control groups were also established. We also 
examined the moderating impacts of experience and some components of mindfulness on the 








Figure 3.1. Schematic Representation of Conceptual Model 
The main building blocks of the training design are described in more detail below:   
IV: Treatment Condition (X) 
▪ Scripts & Simple Rules Training  
▪ Control 
 
DV:  Underwriting Quality 
Y1: Accuracy 
Y2: Consistency 
MV: Moderating Variables 
M1: Experience 
M2: Mindfulness  




3.2. Training Intervention (independent variable, X)  
As discussed above, the thrust of this research is to look scientifically into the research 
question of whether training, using specifically scripts and simple rules, can help improve 
judgement and decision making in underwriting insurance risk. The aim of the study is to train 
insurance underwriters to do a good job by improving intuitive and deliberate judgements in 
insurance risk underwriting. This should hopefully accelerate the acquisition of expert 
judgement that is usually acquired by looking at a lot of cases over many years.   
3.2.1. Scripts Component of Training  
There is not really “one script” for being an underwriter, but rather, a large collection of 
scripts for all the tasks, all the variety of underwriting situations that may come up, for all the 
variety of companies (Hamm, 2004). Logically, the ability to do each of the underwriting tasks 
has to be built up, with attention as acquired and then automated into higher order structures or 
scripts that can be executed automatically and with the ability to focus consciously on any 
component when there is a problem. The distilling of learnings from the expert scripts into 
simple rules then helps trainees understand the reasons things are done. 
Training interventions were designed to improve decision making, guided by a decision-
script account of how experienced professionals make decisions. This contrasts with the JDM 
hope that people can carry out decision-theoretic analyses if trained, or by the notion that 
informing people about the errors that may be caused by heuristic strategies for estimating 
probability or value will enable them to use their heuristic strategies more judiciously. Training 
novices to use a script requires more than giving them paper copies of the specification of the 
strategy. Scripts are learned through explicit study, implicit modelling, practice, and review 
(Abernathy and Hamm, 1994, 1995). At intermediate stages in learning, the student or novice 
will have some scripts that are very well developed, others that are known just in outline form, 
and others that may not be known at all. Steps must be taken to ensure that people learn it, to 
support them in the practice necessary to master it, and to reward their use of the script on an 




ongoing basis. It may be effective to also train insurance underwriters with an approach that has 
had success in training of surgeons; airline pilots and military officers (Hamm et al, 2000).  
There are advantages and disadvantages of scripts of script training. On the plus side, the 
decision-scripts concept has face validity. It could account for results that were anomalous when 
observed by those working within the JDM research framework (Hamm, 2004). Script models 
may be viewed as more relevant to what people actually do than an approach which insists that 
people get as close as possible to the conclusions that could be drawn by analytical use of 
statistical data (Norman, 2000). On the negative side, some have criticized the script idea as 
just “rote learning” (Hamm, 2004). Also, doing research on the scripts requires detailed 
observation and this effort may have hindered researches exploring the concept in other 
domains (outside medicine).  
Initial research was needed to discover the variety of scripts experienced underwriters 
actually have and why they use these scripts. This might be approached through some form of 
cognitive task analysis (CTA) (Klein, 1993). Underwriters could be studied while thinking 
aloud as they work or respond to hypothetical cases. Comparisons could be made between 
experts and novices (Abernathy and Hamm, 1994) or between underwriters known to 
underwriting cases aggressively or conservatively. The scope of this present research included 
discovering the approaches underwriters use for handling conflict between several of their own 
scripts that apply to the situation, as well as conflicts between underwriters who have different 
scripts. Once the scripts were developed, then they were analyzed to see what is the 
underwriting process and simple rules used.  
Scripts were presented to a group of underwriters in a structured learning environment. 
This could have been delivered by pre-reads; lecture or blended learning. The underwriters were 
shown many scripts and the observations discussed in detailed. Given exposure to script 
training, the underwriter should gain underwriting skill (from learning, experience and not 
repeating past errors), which leads to a higher underwriting accuracy and consistency.  




3.2.2. Simple Rules Based Component of Training  
After examining many scripts, I attempted to extract the simple rules that make risks 
insurable and to accept/decline an offer e.g., don’t cover non-random events – which Bingham 
and Eisenhardt (2011) define as selection heuristics. For a risk to be insured, it must have a 
number of specific characteristics – e.g. the risk event needs to be random (as illustrated above). 
Further simple selection rules for insurable risks are illustrated in Table A2.1 in Appendix II 
below. These simple rules on what is insurable are not always well know or explicit – but learnt 
with experience.  
The insurance industry is constantly shifting the boundaries on what is insurable: what was 
uninsurable yesterday, we insure today and what is uninsurable today, we can insure tomorrow. 
We have known most of the risks for a long time in our industry – health insurance, car 
insurance, all these products. In addition, there are always new innovations, derived from the 
ongoing increase in knowledge. For example, when AIDS became an issue in the 1980s, the 
risk was uninsurable. Meanwhile, medical advances have made this risk more of a chronic 
illness and with a better understanding of the risks we now offer life insurance policies that 
include the risk of AIDS. Likewise, better modelling of flood risk can make previously 
uninsurable homes insurable. 
Once it has been decided that the risk is insurable, then simple risk mitigation procedural 
rules should be used to manage the risk. For example, a limit could be imposed on the insurance 
payout for higher risks to protect the company for a very large payout. Further simple procedural 
risk mitigation rules for insurable risks are illustrated in Table A2.2. in Appendix II below – but 
are not the main rules trained on in this study. These risk mitigation rules are at the core of 
proper risk management – and also impact the appropriate pricing for these risk. Risk-based 
pricing can also influence positively the behaviour of individuals (e.g. a non-claim discount on 
car insurance will reduce premium and foster alignment between insurer and customer). 




In the risk decision stage the underwriter needs to decide whether to “ACCEPT” or 
“DECLINE” the case. He needs to reconcile the analysis (quantitative) with the intuitive and 
deliberate judgement (qualitative). The residual risk then needs to considered relative to the 
premium and the risk-return trade-off assessed. Insurance companies may charge higher 
premiums to higher risk policyholders in order to compensate for the higher degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the risks they are taking on. The underwriter should be willing to walk 
away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained. Many underwriters are unable to 
consistently do this (Buffet, 2015).  
 
Figure 3.2.2.  Steps in the Insurance Risk Underwriting Process 
The distilling of learnings from the expert scripts into simple rules then develops a portfolio of 
simple rules to apply. Then in the simple rules training component the underwriters will be 
shown the basic underwriting process and the rules tables for the different stages. Given 
exposure to simple rules training, the underwriter should gain some underwriting skill, which 
leads to a higher underwriting accuracy and consistency.  
3.2.3. Combining Scripts and Simple Rules Based Training  
Now if we look at a training programme incorporating both scripts into simple rules, 
this has the potential to be more impactful – and greater than the impact of any of the individual 
trainings. This will cover the three elements to develop expertise (Kahneman and Klein, 2009) 
– the scripts technique gives exposure to many cases; the simple rules then provides 
systematised knowledge and the underwriting process ensures objective feedback. 




3.3. Work Sample Tests (WST’s) Used in Training 
To ascertain the underwriting skill of underwriters, I used a work sample test (WST). 
WST’s are high-fidelity assessment techniques that present conditions that are highly similar to 
essential challenges and situations on an actual job (Geisinger, 2013). WST’s have been used 
for a variety of certification, training, and performance evaluation for a wide variety of jobs. 
Work samples can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of training programs. For example, if 
the objective of a training program is to improve underwriting quality, then a WST can be 
administered at the end of the training to determine whether the training objectives were 
achieved. The effectiveness of training can also be evaluated by giving WSTs to subjects before 
the training and immediately after to statistically test whether there has been any material 
improvement. WST can also be administered on a follow-up basis to ascertain if the knowledge 
and skills learned in training have been transferred to the work setting (Felker, Curtin and Rose, 
2007).  
As with any test, a WST is only a sample; here, the sample is an important sample of 
the domain of tasks in underwriting. This sample may be relatively narrow, but it is essential 
for effective job performance. The WST should contain the problems and challenges 
encountered on the job i.e. content fidelity. Situational fidelity ensures that features such as the 
industry and setting, time pressure, and stress match the actual conditions that underwriters are 
subject to. Psychological fidelity implies that the WST is measuring the knowledge, skills, 
abilities, and other characteristics required for effective job performance. In addition, as with 
all tests, the administration and scoring of WST’s is controlled. Underwriting internships, 
defined as structured and career relevant underwriting experiences under a senior underwriter, 
may have a higher fidelity level (Geisinger, 2013) because interns tend to complete more than 
a small portion of the tasks that are required to perform well at the particular job.  
Validity on a test / measure is achieved if it measures what it is supposed to measure 
(Geisinger, 2013). If the results of the underwriter test claimed that a poor underwriter was in 




fact good, the test would be invalid. Regarding valid measurement, the key issue is whether 
there are any objectively, factually correct answers to the choices that participants make.  
Reliability is another term for consistency. If one person takes the same underwriting test 
several times and always receives the same results, the test is reliable. Reliability and validity 
are independent of each other (Geisinger, 2013). Validity evidence is typically gathered using 
subject matter experts who review test items and rate them with respect to their relevance and 
appropriateness for measuring the construct and with respect to the adequacy with which test 
content is congruent with the purpose of testing (Geisinger, 2013). Such analyses are important 
because they represent independent appraisals of what is intended to be measured. The scripts 
training, by definition, has face validity.  
Test delivery options could be made on paper or online. The test answers should either 
be an “ACCEPT” or a “DECLINE”. For explanations on the decision making process can be 
extracted in follow-up interviews. There was a schedule for pilot testing (a small-scale activity) 
followed by field testing (a larger activity likely to yield statistical results)  (Geisinger, 2013). 
There should also be a plan for equating test forms over time – in terms of breadth of questions; 
difficulty; etc. The more thoughtful and detailed this test design, the more likely it is that the 
resulting test will meet its measurement goals. An example of a WST that can be used to 
determine underwriting quality in pre and post training interventions is presented in Appendix 
IV. 
The use of WST in the training also has benefits for the learning process. WST’s will force 
participants to generate answers to underwriting problems and this should help improve 
subsequent learning even if the generated answer is wrong (Epstein, 2019). The short-term 
struggle caused by being forced to provide answers in the test has the  long-term benefit of 
facilitating “deep learning” by making connections (Epstein, 2016). The format of training and 
learning with WST’s is more active than a passive lecture format – and this active learning 
facilitates improvements in skill levels. 




3.4. Measuring Underwriting Quality (dependent variable, Y)  
Insurance underwriting quality has 2 main dimensions: accuracy and consistency. These 
two aspects are covered in the sections below:  
3.4.1. Underwriting Accuracy (Y1) 
The accuracy of an insurance underwriting decision is determined by whether the 
underwriter gets the underwriting decision correct. Underwriting is the process of evaluating the 
risk of insuring an event and to determine if it's profitable for the insurance company to take the 
chance. After determining risk, the underwriter sets a premium (price) and terms and conditions 
under which the risk will be covered by the insurer/reinsurer. Underwriters are trained insurance 
professionals who understand risks, both Life and Health (L&H) and Property and Casualty 
(P&C) – and how to prevent them. They have specialized knowledge in risk assessment and use 
this to underwrite. 
An insurance underwriter's role is to choose who and what the insurance company will 
insure based on this risk assessment – following the following key steps:  
i. Reviews specific information to determine what the actual risk is and whether it is insurable. 
ii. Determines what is the price and terms/conditions under which the insurance agreement is. 
May restrict or alter coverage by endorsement. Looks for proactive solutions that may reduce 
or eliminate the risk of future insurance claims i.e. risk mitigation. 
iii. Based on the risk-return profile decides to “ACCEPT” or “DECLINE” the insurance cover. 
iv. Finally, monitors the performance of the treaty and provide important feedback into the next 
coverage period. 
The accuracy of the underwriting decision is whether the underwriter makes the correct 
decision which will be determined ultimately by the profitability of the deal. This could be 
known within a year for most forms of P&C business. However, the profitability for L&H  
business could take time to emerge. The insurance industry has lost billions of USD’s based on 
poor underwriting decisions in recent times. Hence, these underwriting decisions are crucial.    




3.4.2. Underwriting Consistency (Y2) 
The concept of “noise” or “variance” has recently been promoted by Kahneman (2018) 
and Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) as a source of errors and somewhat distinctive from bias. 
The term “bias” has entered the public consciousness to the extent that the words “error” and 
“bias” are often used interchangeably. This is incorrect. In fact, better decisions are not achieved 
merely by reducing general biases (such as optimism) or specific social and cognitive biases 
(such as discrimination against women or anchoring effects). Executives who are concerned 
with accuracy should also confront the prevalence of inconsistency in professional judgements  
- i.e. noise. Noise is more difficult to appreciate than bias, but it is no less real or less costly. 
Kahneman (2018) emphasizes one point: where there is judgement there is noise, and 
there’s usually more of it than you think. Kahneman described noise as inconsistent and 
arbitrary decision making, whereas, bias is defined as a consistent, formulaic error.  Further 
research needs to be done on the sources of noise – perception, internal judgement and more. 
People put attention toward different things when making decisions at different moments – and 
these differences lead to inconsistency or noise.  
Kahneman (2018) shared his results from a consulting job with a leading insurance 
company to explain how noise and bias can lead to error in human decision-making, which can 
have significant financial consequences for companies Kahneman gave six cases to fifty 
underwriters at a leading insurance company. The underwriters were to assess these cases as if 
they were real. Kahneman collected the underwriters assessments of each case and the average 
amount of money they gave out. Many people believe that in a well-run organization there 
should be about 10-15% variability among each employee regarding the amount of money they 
would give to a case. However, Kahneman’s findings were striking. When he computed the 
results, he discovered there was a 56% variability among the underwriters and claim adjusters 
regarding the amount of money they gave out in each case. This level of noise is shocking to 
executives and that level of noise is intolerable (Kahneman, 2018). If underwriters are that 




noisy, it undermines the purpose of the professions. The work of Kahneman also mostly showed 
that experience did not reduce noise. Comparing people with more than 5 years of experience 
on the job to novices, the experienced people had just as much noise. 
Replacing human decisions with an algorithm should be considered whenever 
professional judgements are noisy, but in most cases this solution will be too radical or simply 
impractical – until further trust is gained in these algorithms (Liebowitz et al, 2018). An 
alternative is to adopt procedures and judgement tool that promote consistency by ensuring that 
employees in the same role use similar methods to seek information, integrate it into a view of 
the case, and translate that view into a decision. Training is crucial, of course, professionals 
should be offered user-friendly tools, such as checklists (Gawande, 2011) and carefully 
formulated questions, to guide them as they collect information about a case, make intermediate 
judgements, and formulate a final decision. Unwanted variability occurs at each of those stages, 
and firms can—and should—test how much such tools reduce it. Ideally, the people who use 
these tools and are more mindful will view them as aids that help them do their jobs effectively 
and economically. The task of constructing judgement tools that are both effective and user-
friendly is more difficult than many executives think (Kahneman, 2018).  
When measuring the quality of decisions we look not only at the accuracy of decisions 
– but also at the consistency of the decisions or noise. We will examine the research question if 
scripts and simple rules training will also reduce the level of noise in underwriting decisions. 
The noise in underwriting decisions can cost insurers millions and any training intervention to 
reduce the noise will well be worth the effort. The training will give underwriters a greater 
awareness and understanding of the process, factors and resulting principles (from scripts and 
simple rules) going into underwriting decisions. Hence, they will be more consistent and less 
affected by the factors that can lead to noise in decisions.   
As the above described training is designed to improve underwriting quality, as measured 
through accuracy and consistency in the work sample tests, hence we hypothesize that: 




H1: Impact of Combined Scripts and Simple Rules Training on Insurance Risk 
Underwriting Quality 
H1a: Insurance risk underwriting combined scripts and simple rules training will have a 
positive effect on accuracy in insurance risk underwriting decisions. 
H1b:Insurance risk underwriting combined scripts and simple rules training will have a 
positive effect on consistency in insurance risk underwriting decisions. 
 
3.5. The Impact of Moderating Variables on Insurance Risk Underwriting Training 
(moderating variable, M)  
3.5.1. The Impact of Experience on Insurance Underwriting Training  
Experience will have a moderating impact on the main effect relationship described 
above between training and underwriting accuracy / consistency. As the number of years of 
experience working as an underwriter increases, the  impact of training on skill levels is 
dampened due to the already higher skills levels of experienced underwriters, which leads to a 
lower underwriting accuracy improvement. With experience, underwriters gain highly 
organized, domain-specific knowledge that allows them to encode complex insurance and 
financial information (Hoffman et al, 2014). This skill results in faster and more accurate 
underwriting performance. In underwriting tasks, experienced underwriters regularly employ 
recognition, pattern matching and mental simulation techniques. This relationship does not hold 
in all domains and hence it will be interesting to explore in the insurance underwriting domain. 
Expertise, unlike experience, does not just develop over time (Hoffman et al, 2014). The 
conditions needed for expertise to develop are exposure to many cases; systematised knowledge 
and objective feedback (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Overall, the above suggests both a main 
effect and a moderating effect of experience. Hence, more formally, we hypothesize the 
following: 
 




H2: Main Effect of Experience on Underwriting Quality 
H2a:   Experience will be positively associated with accuracy in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions.      
H2b:   Experience will be positively associated with consistency in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions.      
H3: Moderating Effect of Experience on the Effect of Training on Underwriting Quality 
H3a: Experience will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on accuracy 
in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser 
for those having more experience working as an underwriter.      
H3b: Experience will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on consistency 
in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser 
for those having more experience working as an underwriter.      
 
3.5.2. The Impact of Mindfulness on Insurance Underwriting Training  
Mindfulness, most often defined as the state of being openly attentive to and aware of 
what is taking place in the present, both internally and externally (Reb and Atkins, 2015) should 
help underwriters maker better forecasts and ultimately better insurance underwriting decisions.  
Mindfulness is characterized by a non-judgmental awareness of and attention to moment-by-
moment cognition, emotion, and sensation without fixation on thoughts of past and future (cf. 
Kabat-Zinn, 1990).  
Tetlock (2015) and Silver (2012) were able to extract some common personality traits 
of the very best forecasters, whom he termed “superforecasters” (Tetlock, 2015) –  citing traits 
like openness, willingness to accept they made mistakes, revising believes; etc. 
Superforecasters harness the clarity of hindsight to develop more vivid pictures of the future. 
This actually relates very well to the objectives of mindfulness training.  Tetlock (2015) 
observed that superforecasters are clever, on average, but by no means geniuses. More 




important than sheer intelligence was mental attitude. Humility in the face of a complex world 
makes superforecasters subtle thinkers. They tend to be comfortable with numbers and 
statistical concepts such as “regression to the mean” – which essentially says that most of the 
time things are pretty normal, so any large deviation is likely to be followed by a shift back 
towards normality. However, Tetlock (2015) noted that superforecasters rarely use 
sophisticated mathematical models to make their forecasts, though they are uniformly highly 
numerate. Comfort with numbers seems a prerequisite for making good forecasts but fancy 
quantitative models are not. This is an interesting observation, given the numerical bent of 
underwriters and actuaries.  
We have proposed that mindfulness can help individuals at each stage of underwriting 
decision – similar to decision making (Karelaia and Reb, 2015). The mindfulness framework 
described below also provides a good framework for making sound insurance underwriting 
decisions and links in with the actuarial control cycle. The framework can be summarised in 
Table 3.5.2. (Karelaia and Reb, 2015) below:  
framing  
the decision 
gathering information coming to conclusions learning from feedback 
▪ seeing a decision 
opportunity 
▪ goal awareness 
▪ option generation 
▪ avoiding irrational 
escalation of 
commitment 
▪ recognising ethical 
dilemmas 
▪ scope of information 
search 
▪ confirmation seeking 
and overconfidence 




▪ reconciling intuition 
and analysis 
▪ making trade-offs 
▪ decision 
implementation 
▪ awareness of 
learning structures 




Table 3.5.2.  Steps in the Mindfulness Process 
At the stage of framing the underwriting decision, mindfulness may increase decision 
goal awareness thereby enhancing decision consistency with one’s objectives and reducing 
post-forecasting regret (Karelaia and Reb, 2015). Greater goal clarity will in turn facilitate 
option generation, which will be further enhanced by creativity that mindfulness is likely to 
spark. Mindfulness may also promote using a forecast range (rather than a point forecast) or 
scenarios to underscore the uncertainty in the forecast.  




At the stage of information gathering and processing, mindfulness may reduce the scope of 
information search and simultaneously increase the quality of information considered. In particular, 
mindful individuals are likely to be less prone to confirmation-seeking and overconfidence (Lakey 
et al., 2007), have a better ability to separate relevant from irrelevant information, and rely less on 
stereotypes. Furthermore, Karelaia and Reb (2015) posit that mindful individuals are more likely 
to objectively assess uncertainty and productively work with it. Mindfulness also has the potential 
to reduce illusory pattern detection, although they acknowledge that more research is clearly needed 
to shed further light on these effects (Karelaia and Reb, 2015). Tetlock (2015) states that 
superforecasters do have a healthy appetite for information, a willingness to revisit their 
predictions in light of new data, and the ability to synthesise material from sources with very 
different outlooks on the world.  Tetlock (2015) also observes that superforecasters think in fine 
gradations – so rather than assigning something a probability of 60 to 40, for instance, a 
superforecaster might, after careful consideration and many small revisions to take account of 
newfound subtleties, settle on odds of 62 to 38. Most important is what Tetlock (2015) calls a 
“growth mindset”: a mix of determination, self-reflection and willingness to learn from one’s 
mistakes. Tetlock (2015) noted that the best forecasters were less interested in whether they 
were right or wrong than in why they were right or wrong - they were always looking for ways 
to improve their performance. This involves a lot of  hard work.  
At the coming to conclusions stage, when the underwriter has to choose a course of action, 
mindfulness can help by improving one’s ability to use both judgement and analysis to reach a 
forecast, even when the two systems suggest different choices (Karelaia and Reb, 2015). Moreover, 
making trade-offs should be easier for more mindful decision makers, which will reduce forecast 
deferral and forecast avoidance (Karelaia and Reb, 2015). Mindfulness is also likely to facilitate 
forecasting implementation by reducing the intention-behaviour gap (Chatzisarantis and Hagger, 
2007). Tetlock (2015) noted that scepticism, learning from mistakes, openness and hard work 
enabled smart amateurs using publicly available information to outperform skilled intelligence 




analysts. Tetlock (2015) observed that superforecasters displayed certain behaviours like basing 
their predictions on data and logic; trying to eliminate personal bias; keeping track of records 
so that they know how accurate they are; thinking in terms of probabilities; recognizing that 
everything is uncertain; unpacking a question into its component parts; distinguishing between 
what is known and unknown, and scrutinizing their assumptions. Tetlock (2015) divides people 
into two categories: hedgehogs, whose understanding of the world depends on one or two big 
ideas, and foxes, who think the world is too complicated to boil down into a single slogan. 
Tetlock (2015) concludes that superforecasters are drawn exclusively from the ranks of the 
foxes. Hedgehogs are confident in their deep knowledge and are often guided by one or two 
theories (e.g. Keynesianism; post-liberalism; communism; etc.). Foxes are sceptical about such 
theories, open-minded, cautious in their forecasts and quick to adjust their ideas as events 
change. Rather than rely on one or two simplifying ideas to explain events, Tetlock's (2015) 
superforecaster foxes embraced complexity and were comfortable with ambiguity and a sense 
of doubt. 
Finally, mindful underwriters are more likely to learn from feedback and, importantly, learn 
the right lessons (Karelaia and Reb, 2015). Perhaps most encouragingly, Tetlock (2015) found 
that people can be trained to be better forecasters and even with just one hour of training results 
could be raised by 10 percent. For individuals, the training focused on thinking in terms of 
probabilities and removing thinking biases – for instance, focussing on the limitations of one's 
own knowledge and being open to alternative views. In other words, prediction is not only 
possible, it is teachable. Politics and human affairs are not inscrutable mysteries (Tetlock, 
2015). Instead, they are a bit like weather forecasting, where short-term predictions are possible 
and reasonably accurate (Silver,  2012).  
The Actuarial Control Cycle (Lyon et al,2010) is similar to the process described above 
and is based on a simple problem-solving algorithm: define the problem; design the solution; 
and monitor the results. The whole process, or control cycle, is conducted within an 




environment or context that shapes the decisions taken. The cycle is iterative: the three steps 
may be repeated or at any stage we may return to an earlier step. This problem-solving process 
is universal. It applies to any field of activity. What makes the Actuarial Control Cycle distinctly 
actuarial is the nature of the work carried out at each stage of the cycle. The problem will usually 
involve uncertain future cash flows. The process of defining the problem includes 
understanding the background, fully identifying all the issues and specifying them clearly to 
ensure that the client and the actuary / underwriter agree on the work to be done. The design of 
a solution will almost always involve modelling (analysis) and judgement. The actuary / 
underwriter may have ongoing responsibility for monitoring the experience as it develops and 
advising on the response. Underwriting decisions will never be perfectly accurate. Underwriters 
/ actuaries use these observations and experience to update their models; assumptions and 
judgement. This feedback cycle is termed the Actuarial Control Cycle (Lyon, 2010) and 
systematically addresses discrepancies between the underwriter’s decisions and observed 
reality.  There is overlap with the general underwriting process; actuarial control cycle and 
mindfulness process, as illustrated in Figure 3.5.2. below:  
 
Figure 3.5.2. Overlaps between the Insurance Risk Underwriting Process and Mindfulness Process 




Underwriters / actuaries who follow the above processes will be more mindful in their 
decision making. We will investigate later the moderating influence of mindfulness on the 
impact of scripts and simple rules training and hypothesize the impact being lesser / greater for 
those having more mindfulness working as an underwriter. The mindfulness framework 
outlined above is fully congruent with the processes needed for scripts and simple rules training 
to be effective.  
Mindfulness will have a moderating impact on the main effect relationship described 
above between training and underwriting accuracy. As the mindfulness as an underwriter 
increases, the impact of training on skill levels is dampened. Underwriters with higher 
mindfulness will already understand the process to gain highly organized, domain-specific 
knowledge that allows them to encode complex insurance and financial information. This skill 
results in faster and more accurate underwriting performance. The  impact of training on skill 
levels for more mindful subjects is hence dampened due to them already being more attune with 
the concepts of scripts and/or simple rules. Overall, the above suggests both a positive main 
effect of mindfulness, as well as a negative moderating effect.  
A distinction can also be made between mindfulness as a trait and mindfulness as a state.  
Mindfulness as trait can be viewed in terms of one’s predisposition to be mindful in daily life 
(Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006). The above mentioned mindfulness refer 
to the trait mindfulness. Mindfulness can also be conceptualized as a state that captures the 
attention levels of participants during the training (Lau et al., 2006) We also hypothesize that 
state mindfulness will have a positive main effect with underwriting quality and also a positive 
moderating effect. With higher state mindfulness attention, participants should show higher 
improvements in both accuracy and consistency post-training. The higher attention levels 
should resulted in them benefiting more from the training and being more focussed during the 
posttest work sample test (WST).  
More formally, we hypothesize the following:  




H4: Main Effect of Mindfulness on Underwriting Quality 
H4a:   Trait Mindfulness will be positively associated with accuracy in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions.      
H4b:   Trait Mindfulness will be positively associated with consistency in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions.      
H4c:   State Mindfulness will be positively associated with accuracy in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions.      
H4d:   State Mindfulness will be positively associated with consistency in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions.   
  
H5: Moderating Effect of Mindfulness on the Effect of Training on Underwriting Quality 
H5a:   Trait Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on 
accuracy in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of 
training being lesser for those higher on Trait Mindfulness.      
H5b: Trait Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on 
consistency in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of 
training being lesser for those for those higher on Trait Mindfulness.      
H5c:   State Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on 
accuracy in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of 
training being higher for those higher on State Mindfulness.      
H5d: State Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on 
consistency in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of 








3.6. Summary of Hypotheses 
IV: Treatment Condition DV: Underwriting Quality
X1: Scripts & Simple Rules Training Y1: Accuracy




















Figure 3.6. Schematic Representation of Variables & Hypotheses (with expected results) 
Table 3.6. Hypotheses Summary  






H1a: Insurance risk underwriting combined scripts and simple rules training will have a positive 
effect on accuracy in insurance risk underwriting decisions. 
H1b:Insurance risk underwriting combined scripts and simple rules training will have a positive 




H2a:   Experience will be positively associated with accuracy in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions. 
H2b: Experience will be positively associated with consistency in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions.     
H3:Moderati
ng Effect of 
Experience  
H3a:   Experience will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on accuracy in 
insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser for 
those having more experience working as an underwriter.      
H3b:   Experience will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training  on consistency 
in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser for 





H4a:   Trait Mindfulness will be positively associated with accuracy in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions.      
H4b: Trait Mindfulness will be positively associated with consistency in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions. 
H4c:   State Mindfulness will be positively associated with accuracy in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions.      






H5a:   Trait Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on 
accuracy in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being 
lesser for those higher on mindfulness.      
H5b:   Trait Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on 
consistency in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being 
lesser for those for those higher on mindfulness. 
H5c:   State Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on 
accuracy in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being 
higher for those higher on mindfulness.      
H5d:   State Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on 
consistency in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being 
higher for those for those higher on mindfulness. 




CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Developing the Scripts for the Training  
 
Participants and Procedure: Initial research, before the training study, was needed to discover 
the variety of scripts or “think alouds” underwriters actually have and why they use these 
scripts. This pre-study involved interviewing underwriters face to face, of varying levels of 
working experience, at an international reinsurance company based in Singapore. We recruited 
participants with the help of the HR department who provided names and email addresses of 
potential participants in different experience bands. An invitation to participate in the interviews 
was sent out via email to 50 underwriters. Participation was voluntary.   
A total of 35 underwriters volunteered for the interviews and 30 were chosen - 10 
underwriters each in junior; mid-career and senior underwriting roles. Underwriters at different 
levels of experience were needed to compare and contrast the scripts. I interviewed each 
underwriter in the offices of the multi-national reinsurer. Each underwriter was presented 5 to 
6 underwriting situations and asked to decide to accept or decline the particular risk. We 
developed the underwriting situations from real-life examples and they were thought to be 
representative of real situations that underwriters have to deal with in practice (Geisinger, 2013 
and Kahneman, 2018). I knew the real-life underwriting situations from working as a senior 
underwriter for many years in a reinsurance company that deals with a wide variety of 
underwriting situations. They were asked to think aloud so that their thought process to arrive 
at the decision could be recorded. Participants were allowed to skip any questions which they 
are not comfortable answering during the interviews. Participants were able to withdraw from 
the study at any point in time by informing the interviewer – but none did. The interviews took 
approximately 30 minutes and were not audio-recorded but only detailed notes transcribed to 
capture the scripts. The interviews were not audio-recorded as this seemed to make the 
underwriters uncomfortable in some early trials.  




The interview process yielded 150 scripts (5 each from 30 underwriters with varying 
levels of experience) across 50 unique underwriting problems (from the 50 underwriting 
problems a sample of 5 or 6 were presented to each underwriter). The scripts take the form of 
recordings (presented in written format) of the verbalized thoughts of underwriters who were 
asked to think aloud as they examined and contemplated the different presented risks. Each of 
the particular risks was presented to a junior; mid-career and senior underwriter. Responses 
were compared and contrasted in the training, between experts and novices or between 
underwriters known to be underwriting cases aggressively or conservatively. I was able to judge 
this given my dual role as both researcher and senior underwriter. Once the scripts were 
developed, I noted some observations on the thought processes of the underwriters. The full 
collection of scripts were also analyzed in detail to see what the underwriting process is and 
what are the simple rules used (see Appendix I and Appendix II).  
 
Example of Underwriter Scripts (or “Think Alouds”): The following are 2 simple examples 
of scripts from insurance underwriting – one where the risk should be “DECLINED” and one 
where it should be “ACCEPTED”. The risk should be accepted/rejected on the criteria of 
whether the risk will be profitable for the company (premiums greater than claims). 
#1. Divorce Insurance:  Insurance product providing coverage for divorce costs in the event of an 
unhappy marriage that leads to an expensive divorce. 






“ACCEPT. There are 
detailed statistics on 
divorce rates that can 
be used to determine 
the probability of 
claim.”  
“Could be – under 
certain 
circumstances. We 
would need to 
interview the couple 
at the outset to 
determine the risk.”  
“DECLINE. We don't cover that, quite apart from 
the dubious ethics involved. A simple rule  of our 
industry is that we insure random risks. This is not 
the case in your example. A spouse could claim that 
he is unhappy and separate from his partner, just to 
get the money from the insurance. It would be naive 
to insure something like that. Hence, it's a clear 
DECLINE” 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. He 
recognizes immediately the non-random potential of the event and the high risk of anti-selection. The 
Junior Underwriter is focused more on the analytical aspects of pricing the risk and misses the obvious 
risk of anti-selection. The Mid-career Underwriter misses the point that the risk is not random.   




#2. Agro Insurance: Insurance product coverage for input costs to farmers for costs stemming from 
damage to crops from drought/hail/etc. 






“DECLINE. Does not 
feel like something 
that could be insured. 
We will be ruined 





not feel like 
something that 
could be insured. 




▪ “This can be viewed as innovative insurance where 
there is real demand. Yes, it's a new type of insurance 
with limited data and models. But with proper 
underwriting, the risk should be insurable. The benefit 
amount meets a financial loss. We could spread the 
risk through global geographic diversification. We 
could look at accumulation control and capacity 
budget through limits. Farmers are an important 
political block in certain countries so price increases 
could create some Political Risk. Overall, given the 
higher premiums we could extract, I will ACCEPT this 
risk.”  
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very methodical is checking through some simple rules of 
what makes a risk insurable. He/she also manages the residual risk through diversification and 
imposing claim limits. He finally looks at the risk-return profile as attractive. The more junior 
underwriters appear paralyzed by the availability bias that prevents them from seeing the insurance 
opportunity.  
Figure 4.1. Examples of Underwriting Scripts 
Of the 50 unique underwriting situations and associated scripts created, 40 were selected 
for the training and 10 held as reserve (in case issues in the pilot training indicated problematic 
problems). A set of 20 problems was carefully selected for the pretest and training (where the 
scripts for the problems were discussed in detail). The 20 problems had to reveal the various 
rules of underwriting. Another set of 20 problems was selected for the posttest and care was 
taken to have it at a similar level of difficulty to the pretest and also covering all simple rules. 
Integrity of Underwriter Scripts: The integrity of scripts was ensured using the two 
approaches of coherence (consistency) and correspondence (Hammond, 2000). As described 
earlier, correspondence is based on performance in the real-world. Correspondence criteria are 
based on the accuracy of predicting or judging empirical events (Hammond, 2000).The 
performance of senior underwriters follows correspondence. Most of the scripts of senior 
underwriters and are backed up by a track record of successful underwriting judged by 
profitability – with mistakes and losses made earlier in their careers. I was able to use my role 
as a senior underwriter to identify the successful scripts from senior underwriters that have led 




in practice to profitable business. In contrast, I was also able to use my role as a senior 
underwriter to evaluate flaws in the scripts of more junior underwriters and point to situations 
where these would have led to losses. 
Range of Underwriter Scripts : An discussed earlier, there are benefits of including a 
wide range of underwriting situations in the training design. Hence, the training design covered 
many different situations by design across Life & Health; Property & Casualty; special lines 
like Space insurance and newer innovative risks like Cyber risk. Training using this wider range 
of cases gives younger underwriters the benefits of breadth and diverse experience and the 
interdisciplinary thinking that comes with that (Epstein, 2019). It also underscores that the 
simple rules extracted from these varied situations are quite universal within the domain of 
insurance and can be applied across a wide range of risks.  
4.2. Extracting the Simple Rules of Insurance Risk Underwriting for Training 
Procedure: From the 50 unique problems and associated scripts, 10 simple rules were extracted 
(see Appendix II). An example from the “Divorce Insurance” example above is that we should 
only be insuring random events (which the client cannot influence) as underlined in the script 
below:  
#1. Divorce Insurance:  Insurance product providing coverage for divorce costs in the event of an 
unhappy marriage that leads to an expensive divorce. 






“ACCEPT. There are 
detailed statistics on 
divorce rates that can 
be used to determine 
the probability of 
claim.”  
“Could be – under 
certain 
circumstances. We 
would need to 
interview the couple 
at the outset to 
determine the risk.”  
“DECLINE. We don't cover that, quite apart from 
the dubious ethics involved. A simple rule  of our 
industry is that we insure random risks. This is 
not the case in your example. A spouse could claim 
that he is unhappy and separate from his partner, just 
to get the money from the insurance. It would be 
naive to insure something like that. Hence, it's a clear 
DECLINE” 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. He 
recognizes immediately the non-random potential of the event and the high risk of anti-selection. The 
Junior Underwriter is focused more on the analytical aspects of pricing the risk and misses the obvious 
risk of anti-selection. The Mid-career Underwriter misses the point that the risk is not random.   




The main rules are then further developed by expanding on the description and defining some 
of the key terms. For example, we developed the “event must be random” rule further as:  
Rule Rule description... 
The risk 
event must 
be Random  
The insured event should be random and unintentional. Ideally, the loss 
should be unforeseen and unexpected by the insured and outside of the 
insured’s control. Thus, if an individual deliberately causes a loss, he or she 
should not be indemnified for the loss. Moral hazard/ anti-selection is 
increased if the insured deliberately intends to cause a loss. Adverse selection 
is the tendency of persons with a higher-than-average chance of loss to seek 
insurance at standard rates. Moral Hazard is dishonesty or character defects 
in an individual that increase the frequency or severity of loss. 
Figure 4.2. Examples of simple rules Developed from an underwriting script. 
The extant literature on insurance does not cover the simple rules extracted in this study 
in a comprehensive way. The existing literature may go deep into one of the principles e.g. the 
principle or “rule of indemnity” – but does not provide a comprehensive list or look into how 
these rules emerge from underwriting scripts. Hence, this study also contributes to the existing 
insurance literature by providing a comprehensive set of simple rules to apply to assess the 
viability of an insurance scheme. I did draw on some insurance literature to define key terms 
(e.g. moral hazard) and develop the rules further (Thoyts, 2010; Redja & McNamara, 2017). 
The full list of simple rules needed for insurance underwriting is presented in Appendix II. 
The simple rules incorporated into the training programme in this study falls within the 
scope of coherence (Hammond, 2000). The simple rules are congruent with the concept of 
coherence or consistency criteria that are based on normative standards of and rationality. The 
set of rules emerging from this study is also relatively few at 10 (see Appendix II) – and as 
mentioned earlier, quite universal within the domain of insurance.   




4.3.  Training and Control Participants and Samples 
In total, we held 6 sessions (4 training; 2 control) to collect the data for this the following 
research. The table below gives a summary of the 6 sessions   
Table 4.3. Summary of Training and Control Sessions 






Professionals P1 Training International Reinsurer’s 
Underwriters 
40 110 26.0 4.1 
P2 Training Singapore Industry 
Underwriters 
35 31.3 7.2 
P3 Control Singapore Industry 
Underwriters 
35 27.6 4.3 
Students S1 Training Actuarial Science Club 24 110 21.3 2.1 
S2 Training JDM class pm 44 22.2 1.1 
S3 Control JDM class am 42 22.4 
 
1.3 
NB: By coincidence the number of Professionals and Students were both 110 but 1 professional 
with no experience was recoded as a Student. 
4.3.1. Professionals:  Three training sessions were conducted using professionals working in 
the insurance/reinsurance industry: 
Session P1: The first study and pilot involved training 40, mainly junior, underwriters 
at an international reinsurance company’s Singapore branch. Junior underwriters with working 
experience of less than 5 years were mainly targeted as it was reasoned that they would have 
most to gain from such training. However, a few more experienced underwriters participated – 
but the overall experience level was skewed to the more junior underwriters.  The main 
researcher recruited participants with the help of the HR department who gathered names and 
email addresses of potential participants in desired experience band.  HR then sent out the 
recruitment email on my behalf to the mainly junior underwriters and 40 accepted. More senior 
underwriters also requested to attend the training and were allowed to. The training was 
conducted at the training facility of the reinsurance company in downtown Singapore. 
Participants were sent details of the training time, date, venue and synopsis of the training. 
There was one intern in this group with no experience who was subsequently coded as student. 




Sessions P2 & P3: This study involved training underwriters of relatively junior 
experience levels working in Singapore insurance/reinsurance industry who attended a training 
session sponsored by the Singapore Actuarial Society (SAS). Participants were recruited with 
the help of the Singapore Actuarial Society who sent out the recruitment email to their mainly 
junior members to take part in the study. Potential participants were presented with two 
alternative dates and interested junior underwriters were assigned to the P2 training (earlier) or 
P3 control (later date) study based on their availability. Participants were not told which session 
would be training/control. The number of participants was capped at 35 for each session due to 
the capacity of the training venue and both sessions were over- subscribed. The training was 
again conducted at the training facility of the reinsurance company in downtown Singapore. 
Participants were sent details of the training time, date, venue and synopsis of the training. 
4.3.2. Students:  Three studies were conducted using students not working in the 
insurance/reinsurance industry – but studying at a Singaporean business school. 
Sessions S1:  In the first session with the students, 24 students from the Actuarial 
Science club of the Singaporean business school were trained.  Students were from a varied 
backgrounds in the club and not just studying Actuarial Science – but also Economics; Law and 
other business majors. Participants were recruited with the help of the students running the 
Actuarial Science club who sent out the recruitment email to their members to take part in the 
study (to comply with the PDPA, the club did not copy me in the recruitment email). The 
training was conducted at a training facility on the business school campus in downtown 
Singapore. Participants were sent details of the training venue and synopsis of the training. 
Sessions S2 & S3: Participants were students in a Singaporean business school taking a 
course in JDM. The students were informed by the instructor of the training which was 
conducted during one of the regular sessions of the programme. The class was broken up into 
2 groups – a morning session and an afternoon session. A coin was flipped to determine that 




the training intervention was conducted in the afternoon session (S2, 44 students) and the 
control treatment in the morning session (S3, 42 students).  
 
4.4. Combined Scripts and Simple Rules Training Method 
Training Procedure: I trained these underwriters/students in an intensive 2-hour training 
session focusing on underwriting scripts and simple rules (see Appendix V for schedule). 4 
iterations of the training were conducted plus an additional 2 control studies. To ensure 
consistency across the different iterations, all training and control studies were conducted by 
the main researcher.   
Before the training study participants read an informed consent form and indicated their 
consent by signing the form. Participants were also asked to sign an attendance sheet at the start 
of the training session and were provided a unique participant ID, which they needed to input 
on test/surveys during the study and acted as a unique identifier for participants to match the 
different surveys/data collections. No names or other personal identifiers (e.g., phone numbers) 
were collected but age, gender and experience (in years) recorded by participants (on pre-test 
sheets). Participants then completed a 10 minute pre-training mindfulness survey (Appendix 
III). Then a 20 minute pre-training working sample test (WST) (as in Appendix IV) to test their 
underwriting quality was administered. All the data was collected within the actual training 
session, including the pre-training mindfulness scale and the pre-test. Data was collected via 
hard copies as it was more convenient during the training for participants (instead of online).  
The training started immediately after the pre-training mindfulness survey and the pre-
test paper was collected (30 minutes into the training). The training lasted approximately one 
hour and a PowerPoint presentation format was used.  The training started with a brief 
introduction to definition of insurance underwriting. This was followed by an introduction of 
concepts around scripts and simple rules. The main part of the training then followed with a 
detailed analysis of the pre-test results using the scripts for the 20 questions in the pre-test. The 




scripts of the underwriters at varying levels of experience were presented and compared and 
contrasted. The observations from the researcher were discussed and the simple rules 
underlying good underwriting decisions were extracted from the scripts. The training was 
concluded with a summary of the simple rules – and an illustration of how the simple rules 
application can ensure accuracy and consistency across underwriting decisions (see Appendix 
II).   
Immediately after the training participants underwent a 20 minute post-training test to 
gauge the impact of the training intervention. Participants were presented with a new set of 20 
underwriting situations and again asked to ACCEPT/DECLINE the risk. As mentioned earlier, 
care was taken to ensure that the posttest was of a similar level of difficulty as the pretest and 
also covered the full range of simple underwriting rules. Once participants had completed the 
study, they were shown a study debrief explaining the purpose of the study and also allowed 
the opportunity to withdraw their data, but none did.  
 
4.5. Control Study Training Method 
The control study followed mainly the above training process – with the same surveys 
and pretest and posttest. However, the key change was instead of the scripts and simple rules 
training, a video of approximately one hour duration (same duration as the training) was 
presented to control participants. The video was chosen to be somewhat related to the topic but 
did not cover any of the script and simple rule insurance underwriting material used in the main 
training.  The video was a talk by Daniel Kahneman on Expertise, Bias and the Investment 
Industry delivered at the 2018 Global CFA conference in Hong Kong.  A link to this talk is 
given in the references section under Kahneman (2018). He covered some of the key ideas that 
have driven his scholarship, exploring intuition, expertise, bias, noise, and how optimism and 
overconfidence simultaneously drive and undermine the capitalist system (Kahneman,2018). 
 




4.6. Measures  
4.6.1. Dependent variables:  The main interest of the study is to determine if the training 
intervention could increase underwriting quality, both accuracy and consistency (as discussed 
in Chapter 3). Hence, Accuracy and Consistency were the dependent variables in the study. We 
measured Accuracy and Consistency of underwriting using the work sample test (WST’s, see 
Appendix IV). The Accuracy measure was simply calculated by granting ½ point for each 
correct answer. As there were 20 questions in the WST, the total score for Accuracy was out of 
10. For the Consistency measure a point was awarded if participants got a pair of linked (by 
same simple rule) correct (see Appendix IV). 
 
4.6.2. Moderator variables: We were interested in the moderating impact of experience and 
mindfulness on the results. Experience was measured in years working as an underwriter. All 
students were coded with 0 experience. We also used the Status measure to differentiate 
between working Professionals and university Students.  Mindfulness was measured by using  
a two component model of mindfulness that may best describe these psychological states, in 
which one state is attentional and the other state is about meta-awareness (Bishop et al., 2004; 
Garland, Gaylord, and Fredrickson, 2011; Kudesia, 2019).  
▪ Mindful attention refers to the state in which people continuously allocate their attention 
toward ongoing situations, actively gathering the available information, rather than allowing 
interference from unrelated thoughts and feelings (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Dane, 2011; Mrazek, 
Smallwood, and Schooler, 2012).  
▪ Mindful meta-awareness refers to the state in which people mentally “step back” from their 
interpretations of ongoing situations and monitor these interpretations from a detached stance, 
rather than automatically assuming them (Teasdale, 1999; Bernstein et al., 2015). 
The following 3 Mindfulness measures were captured:  
 











A 5 item mindfulness attention measure that aims to capture the mindfulness attention trait 
present-moment attention (lack of absentmindedness). This was measured pretest to assess the 
attention trait of participants. All participants anonymously responded to a survey measure, 
scored on a 5-pt Likert-style scale with  scale end points (1, 5) (see Appendix III for full scale).  
Participants reported their mindful attention using items from the Mindful Attention and 
Awareness Scale (Brown and Ryan, 2003), which is the most commonly used scale in 
management (Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane, 2016). These items assess the tendency for attention 
to drift from ongoing events and are thus reverse-scored to indicate mindful attention. 
Representative items include “I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.” 






A 6 item mindfulness attention measure that aims to capture the mindfulness attention trait meta-
awareness. This was measured pretest to assess the meta-awareness trait of participants. All 
participants anonymously responded to a survey measure, scored on a 5-pt Likert-style scale 
with  scale end points (1, 5) (see Appendix III for full scale).  
Participants reported their mindful meta-awareness using items from the Experiences 
Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007), which is one of the few face valid scales of the metacognitive 
component of mindfulness that are also validated for use on non-clinical populations (Bernstein 
et al., 2015). These items assess the tendency to monitor thoughts and feelings in a detached 
manner. Representative items include “I can separate myself from my thoughts and feelings” 





A 5 item mindfulness attention measure that aims to capture the state of mind during the training. 
This was measured potsttest to assess the state of attention during the training and test. This was 
measured on a 5 point Likert scale with  scale end points (1, 5). (see Appendix III for full scale). 
Participants again reported their mindful attention using items from the Mindful Attention and 
Awareness Scale (Brown and Ryan, 2003). Like TMAt, this scale is also reverse coded. 
Representative items include “I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the 
present moment” and “I did things without paying attention. ”  




4.6.3. Control variables: there are numerous contextual factors which may affect the outcomes 
of the study and need to be controlled for.  Hence, we also included the control variables of age; 
gender and education level.  Education level was captured by highest academic qualification 
obtained such as undergraduate; bachelors or masters.  
4.6.4. Summary of Study Variables 
In summary, the following 14 study variables were captured for each participant: 
Table 4.6.4. Description of Study Measures 
# Factor Description 
1 Treatment Training or Control (Control coded 0; Training coded 1) 
2 Participant ID A unique identifier number for each participant. This is used 
to link the pretest & posttest measures  
3 Age Age last birthday at time of training 
4 Gender Female = F; Male =M (Female coded 0; Male coded 1) 
5 Status Professional  (P) or Student (S)  
(Student coded 0; Professional coded 1) 
6 Experience Measured in years working as an underwriter (for all 
companies). All students were coded with 0 experience. 
7 Education Highest academic qualification: Undergraduate (U); 
Bachelors (B) or Masters (M) – (coded 0;1;2 respectively) 
8 Pretest-TMAt Trait mindful attention - a 5 item mindfulness trait attention 
measure. This was measured pretest on a 5 point Likert scale 
with  scale end points (1, 5).  Reverse coded so transformed 
by 6 – score. (see Appendix III) 
9 Pretest-TMAw Trait meta-awareness (TMAw) - 6 item mindfulness 
awareness measure.  This was measured pretest on a 5 point 
Likert scale with  scale end points (1, 5). (see Appendix III)  
10 Posttest-SMAt State mindful attention (SMAt) – a 5 item mindfulness 
attention measure. This was measured potsttest to assess the 
state of attention during the task. This was measured on a 5 
point Likert scale with  scale end points (1, 5).  Reverse coded 
so transformed by 6 – score. (see Appendix III) 
11 Pretest - Accuracy Accuracy measured before the treatment, ½ point for each 
correct answer (see Appendix IV) 
12 Posttest - Accuracy Accuracy measured after the treatment,  ½ point for each 
correct answer (see Appendix IV) 
13 Pretest - Consistency Consistency measured before the treatment, 1 point for each 
correct pair (see Appendix IV) 
14 Posttest - Consistency Consistency measured after the treatment, 1 point for each 
correct pair (see Appendix IV) 
 
  




CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1. Data 
220 (143 for Training and 77 for the Control) rows of data was captured for the participants in 
the study with the 14 study variable data fields described in Chapter 4. An extract of the data is 
presented below: 
Table 5.1.1. Sample of Data  



































































































































Training 2 24 F P 2 B 4.6 3.7 5.0 5.5 7.0 4.0 5.0 
Training 13 24 M P 1 M 3.6 3.0 4.8 6.0 9.0 4.0 8.0 
Training 21 26 F P 3 B 3.2 2.3 3.8 5.5 7.5 5.5 6.0 
Training 68 27 F P 4 B 4.4 3.8 4.0 6.5 9.0 5.0 8.0 
Training 77 23 F P 2 B 4.8 3.8 5.0 5.5 8.5 4.0 8.0 
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
Training 28 21 M S 0 U 1.8 1.7 3.0 7.0 9.0 5.0 8.0 
Training 38 21 F S 0 U 2.0 2.5 4.8 5.5 8.5 3.0 7.0 
Training 76 22 M S 0 U 2.8 3.8 4.8 6.0 9.0 5.0 8.0 
Training 120 19 F S 0 U 3.2 2.7 4.6 6.5 6.0 4.0 4.0 
Training 132 25 M S 0 U 1.0 3.8 1.0 5.5 6.5 5.0 6.0 
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
Control 5001 26 M P 2 M 3.4 3.5 3.8 6.0 6.0 3.0 4.0 
Control 5002 26 M P 4 M 4.2 3.8 5.0 6.5 6.5 5.0 4.0 
Control 5003 22 M P 1 B 3.6 3.7 4.6 5.5 6.5 3.0 4.0 
Control 5004 28 M P 4 B 3.8 3.0 4.8 6.5 5.0 4.0 3.0 
Control 5005 34 M P 10 B 2.4 3.2 4.8 8.0 5.0 3.0 1.0 
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
 
Overall, we felt comfortable combining the data from the separate training sessions for 
Professionals (P1 & P2, see Table 4.3. below) and the separate training sessions for Students 
(S1 & S2, see Table 4.3. below) after checking that the training impact (in terms of mean 
improvements) was similar across the sessions for Professionals and Students respectively.  
Table 5.1.2. below and the shows the means, standard deviations, range (min/max) and 
correlations of the study variables. The data was checked for outliers.  We also reported below 
the Cronbach’s alpha scale reliability for multi-item scales on the diagonal.  




Correlation: The means, standard deviations, correlations for the various continuous measures are shown in the table below: 
Table 5.1.2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Study Variables 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Treatment .7 .5 0 1 1             
2. Age 25.1 5.2 18 48 .050 1            
3. Gender .4 .5 0 1 .025 .306** 1           
4. Status .7 .5 0 1 -.481** .435** .152* 1          
5. Experience 2.6 4.6 0 25 .067 .957** .257** .397** 1         
6. Education .85 .7 0 2 -.031 .492** .250** .510** .445** 1        
7. Pretest_TMAt 3.5 .8 1.0 5.0 .019 .164* .131 .189** .171* .207** .822#       
8. Pretest_TMAw 3.4 .7 1.5 5.0 .044 .097 .171* .054 .086 .024 .376** .727#      
9. Posttest_SMAt 4.0 .82 1.0 5.0 .154* .253** .202** .199** .263** .313** .518** .231** .874#     
10. Pretest_Accuracy 5.7 1.4 1.5 8.5 .012 .350** .160* .196** .398** .281** .091 .051 .199** 1    
11. Posttest_ Accuracy 6.8 1.4 4.0 10.0 .500** .400** .175** .122 .408** .332** .097 .092 .232** .349** 1   
12. Pretest_ Consistency 3.6 1.6 .0 7.0 .106 .385** .117 .184** .439** .264** .103 .089 .157* .863** .469** 1  
13. Posttest_Consistency 5.0 2.0 1.0 10.0 .473** .348** .161* .143* .362** .332** .082 .117 .218** .308** .938** .440** 1 
* p  .05. **p  .01.   # Cronbach’s alpha scale reliability for multi-item scales is reported on the diagonal. 




Treatment vs Control Groups 
We needed to confirm that the treatment and control groups do not statistically differ (p > .05) 
on demographic characteristics or baseline outcome measures. Chi-square (categorical 
variables) and grouped t-tests (continuous measures) were performed to assess this:   
Table 5.1.3. Distribution of Pretest Variables by Training and Control  
# Distribution Training (n=143) Control (n=77) Test of condition 
differences 
 of… Mean SD Mean SD 2 (df) t p-value 
2 Age 25.3 5.6 24.8 4.0  -0.81 .419 
3 Gender M/F: 45%/55% 43%/57% 0.73  .787 
4 Status P/S: 52%/48% P/S: 46%/54% 0.79  .373 
5 Experience 2.9 4.9 2.2 3.7  -0.99 .321 
6 Education U/B/M: 32%/54%/14% U/B/M: 32%/47%/21% 0.29  .406 
7 Pretest_TMAt 3.5 0.8 3.5 0.7  -0.28 .779 
8 Pretest_TMAw 3.4 0.7 3.4 0.7  -0.65 .516 
10 Pretest - Accuracy 5.7 1.3 5.6 1.6  -0.18 .856 
12 Pretest - Consistency 3.8 1.6 3.4 1.7  -1.57 .118 
 Since none of the p-values in the above tests are statistically significant, we confirmed 
that the treatment and control groups do not statistically differ for the various measures listed 
above. 
We also ran a simple t-test to see how the posttest measures differed between the Treatment 
and Control groups:  
 
Table 5.1.4. Distribution of Posttest Variables by Training and Control  
# Distribution Training (n=143) Control (n=77) Test of condition 
differences 
  Mean SD Mean SD t p-value 
9 Postest_SMAt 4.1 .8 3.8 .9 -2.22 .028* 
11 Posttest - Accuracy 7.4 1.3 5.9 1.1 -8.75 .000** 
13 Posttest - Consistency 5.7 1.8 3.7 1.5 -7.93 .000** 
* p  .05  & **p  .01 
The results seem to indicate significant differences between the Training and Control groups – 
but given the repeated measures nature of the experiment design, more sophisticated statistical 
tests needed to be run to test the impact of the training. This will be done in the sections that 
follow. 
 




5.2. Results and Analysis 
5.2.1. Testing the Impact of the Training:  
This section analyses the following hypotheses:  
H1a: Insurance risk underwriting training will have a positive effect on accuracy in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions. 
H1b: Insurance risk underwriting training will have a positive effect on consistency in insurance risk 
underwriting decision. 
 
Paired Samples t-test: The performance of a sample of underwriters before and after 
completing the scripts and simple rules training intervention was measured in a repeated-
measures design. The differences were then analyzed by using a paired sample t-test. The paired 
sample t-test is a statistical procedure used to determine whether the mean difference between 
two sets of observations is zero.  
Table 5.2.1.1. Output for Paired Samples t-test  
 Intervention (n=143) Control (n=77) 
 Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Accuracy 5.7 1.3 7.4 1.3 5.6 1.6 5.9 1.1 





 Intervention (n=143) Control (n=77) 
 Mean SD t p-Value Mean SD t p-Value 
Posttest_Accuracy – 
Prestest_Accuracy 
1.7 1.4 14.24 .000** 0.2 1.48 1.46 .148 
Posttest_Consistency – 
Prestest_Consistency 
1.9 1.9 12.45 .000** 0.3 1.64 1.81 .074 
 
The above results indicate that the pre-posttest difference is significant for both 
Accuracy and Consistency in the training sample. The pre-posttest difference is not statistically 
significant in the control sample. This supports the hypotheses H1a and H1b above. Checks 
were also performed to ensure that the assumption of the paired samples t-test are also met  
(dependent variable continuous; dependent variable should not contain any outliers; 
observations are independent of each other; dependent variable should be approximately 
normally distributed.)  




ANCOVA & ANOVA: Many researchers employ the paired t-test to evaluate the mean 
difference between matched data points but unfortunately, in many cases this test in inefficient. 
The precision of this test can be increased through use of the analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA). ANCOVA models also test the same primary hypotheses H1a and H1b. 
Differences in outcomes at posttest were examined with pretest scores entered as a covariate 
and Treatment condition (training/control)  as a predictor. In addition, we ran a repeated 
measures ANOVA with Time as repeated-measures factor with 2 levels and Treatment as 
between-subjects factor. In the ANOVA analyses, we are looking for a significant Time  
Treatment interaction. Below we report both ANCOVA and repeated-measures ANOVA 
results for completeness:  
Table 5.2.1.2. Output for ANCOVA & ANOVA  
 Posttest adjusted means 
(adjusted for pretest score) 
ANCOVA  
Treatment Test statistics 
ANOVA  
TreatmentTime Test statistics 
 Training Control F-value p-Value 2 F-value p-Value 2 
Accuracy 7.4 5.9 84.37 .000 .280 49.86 .000 .186 
Consistency 5.7 3.7 64.10 .000 .228 40.11 .000 .155 
 
We conclude that the two groups (training and control) differ significantly on posttest 
scores after adjusting for the pretest scores. The F for the treatment variable is larger with the 
ANCOVA than ANOVA, indicating that the ANCOVA has more power. 








































The above means and plots also support the hypotheses H1a and H1b that the Training will 
have a positive effect on the quality of insurance risk underwriting decisions, for both accuracy 
and consistency. The impact seems to be greater for consistency and this is discussed further in 
the next section.  
Finally, we also checked that the various ANCOVA/ANOVA assumptions held:   
Table 5.2.1.3. Assumption Checks for ANCOVA & ANOVA  
# Condition   
1 dependent variable and covariate 
variable should be continuous  
 
YES, scores are 
 
2 independent variable should consist of two or 
more categorical 
 
YES, training & control 
3 independent groups; have independence of 
observations  
 
YES, have different participants in 
each group 
4 no significant outliers 
 
YES, by plot 
5 homogeneity of variances 
 
YES, by Levene's test  
6 Additionally for ANOVA: dependent 
variable should be approximately normally 
distributed for each category of the independent 
variable.  
 
YES, by plot 
7 Additionally for ANCOVA: residuals should 
be approximately normally distributed for each 
category of the independent variable; covariate 
should be linearly related to the dependent 
variable at each level of the independent 
variable; shows homoscedasticity; there needs 
to be homogeneity of regression slopes.  
YES, by tests & plots  
i.Accuracy Score: normality of 
residuals. By using Shapiro-Wilk 
test, p-value = 0.9071 which implies 
the normality assumption is hold. 
ii.Consistency Score: normality of 
residuals By using Shapiro-Wilk 
test, p-value = 0.6522 which implies 




Hence, in conclusion, we accept hypotheses H1a and  H1b.  
 




5.2.2. Testing the Main Effect of Experience  
This section analyses the following hypotheses:  
H2a:Experience will be positively associated with accuracy in insurance risk underwriting decisions. 
H2b:Experience will be positively associated with consistency in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions.  
 
Simple (one-variable) Regression: We ran a simple regression with experience as independent 
variable (IV) and Accuracy and Consistency (pre and posttest) as dependent variables (DVs):  
Table 5.2.2.1. Output for Simple Regression 
IV DV Std coeff t p-Value 
Experience Pretest – Accuracy .398 6.40 .000** 
Experience Posttest – Accuracy .408 6.60 .000** 
Experience Pretest – Consistency .439 7.21 .000** 
Experience Posttest – Consistency .362 5.73 .000** 
 
 
The above analysis supports H2a and H2b that: Experience will be positively associated with 
accuracy / consistency in insurance risk underwriting decisions. The std coeff corresponds to 
the correlations in Table 5.1.2.  
Checks were also performed to ensure that the assumption of linear regression held viz.: 
Table 5.2.2.2. Assumption Checks for Linear Regression 
# Condition  & Check 
1 two variables should be measured at 
the continuous level 
YES 
2 linear relationship between variables  YES, by plot 
3 no significant outliers YES, by plot 
4 independence of observations YES, have different 
participants in each group 
5 show homoscedasticity and residuals (errors) of the 
regression line are approximately normally distributed 
YES, by plot 




 5.2.3. Testing the Moderating Effect of Experience  
This section analyses the following hypotheses:  
H3a:   Experience will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on accuracy in 
insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser for those 
having more experience working as an underwriter.      
H3b:   Experience will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on consistency in 
insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser for those 
having more experience working as an underwriter. 
 
Firstly, given that study was targeted at mainly younger and less experienced 
underwriters, the distribution of participants is not normally distributed and heavily skewed 
towards the lower experience levels, as illustrated in Figure 5.2.3.1. below:  
Figure 5.2.3.1. Distribution of Experience  
 
To further analyse the impact of Experience, we looked at introducing the categorical 
variable Experience_Level which classified the underwriters in groups according to their years 
of experience e.g. an underwriter with just one to four years of experience was classified as 
“Junior”.  We used the following transformation (which was consistent with the classification 
of underwriters used in collecting the scripts in the pre-study) for the Experience_Level:   










N Novice 0 111 
J Junior 1 to 4 67 
M Mid-career 5 to 9 18 
S Senior 10+ 24 
TOTAL 220 
 
We then ran an ANCOVA analysis on the transformed variable Experience_Level and 
the results are presented in the table and plots below:  
Table 5.2.3.2. ANCOVA Output for Treatment    Experience:  
 Posttest adjusted means 
(adjusted for pretest score) 
ANCOVA Test statistics 
Treatment  Experience_Level 
 Training Control F-value p-Value 2 
 N J M S N J M S    
Accuracy 6.6 8.0 8.3 8.2 5.6 5.7 7.3 7.3 6.35 .000** .083 
Consistency 4.6 6.6 6.9 6.8 3.4 3.3 5.8 5.5 8.20 .000** .104 
 
 
 Figure 5.2.3.2. Posttest Adjusted Means by Treatment Condition for various Experience Levels.   
 
The above charts show that the relationship between experience and training impact is 
non-linear. The impact for the Students appears to be subdued. For Professionals, the training 
appears to be most impactful for the Junior underwriters (circled). As hypothesized earlier, the 
impact of the training is lesser for more experience underwiters as they should have developed 
more of this skill over the working years. We also show in the above chart the statistical 




significance of the training within each of the experience groups. The impact of the training is 
statistically significant for all experience groups except the Senior underwriter group. 
The above analysis supports the hypothesis that Experience_Level moderates the impact 
of  Training on undewriting quality (both consistency and accuracy). The above means and 
plots also sugget that the positive effect of training is lesser for those having more Experience 
(M and S) working as an underwriter due to the factors outlined in Chapter 3 and discussed 
further in the next chapter. Hence, we accept the hypotheses H3a and H3b.  
The above analysis clearly illustrate that the impact of the training on Students appears 
to be materially different from the Professionals – with Students showing lesser benefits. Given 
this finding, we further investigated the difference between Students and Professionals using 
the Status variable. Since Status (Professional or Student) is a categorical variable, we examined 
its moderating impact by using an ANCOVA/ANOVA analysis. The differences in outcomes 
at posttest were examined with pretest scores entered as a covariate and Treatment condition 
(training/control) and Status as a predictor (fixed factor).  
Table 5.2.3.3. Output for ANCOVA & ANOVA by Treatment & Status (P & S) 
 Posttest adjusted means 
(adjusted for pretest score) 
ANCOVA Test statistics ANOVA Test statistics 
 Training Control F-value p-Value 2 F-value p-Value 2 
 P S P S       
Accuracy 8.1 6.6 6.3 5. 6 12.34 .001 .054 22.45 .000** .094 
Consistency 6.7 4.6 4.1 3.4 15.20 .000 .066 17.38 .000** .074 
 
Figure 5.2.3.3. Posttest Adjusted Means by Treatment Condition for various Status Levels.   




The above analysis supports the hypothesis that Status moderates the impact of Training 
on undewriting quality (both consistency and accuracy). The above means and plots also sugget 
that the positive effect of training is lesser for Students when compared to Professional. This is 
likely due to the fact that the Students have less familiarity with the industry and hence do not 
grasp the training concepts as well as the Professionals. This is discussed further in the next 
chapter.  
Given the above result we decided to re-run the core Treatment ANCOVA & ANOVA 
from Table 5.2.1.2. for the Professionals and Students subsamples separately:  
Table 5.2.3.4.   Professionals subsample (N=109) ANCOVA & ANOVA Output for Treatment   
 Posttest adjusted means 






 Training Control F-value p-Value 2 F-value p-Value 2 
Accuracy 8.1 6.3 84.80 .000** .444 82.69 .000** .436 
Consistency 6.7 4.1 73.62 .000** .410 53.11 .000** .332 
 
Table 5.2.3.5.   Students subsample (N=111) ANCOVA & ANOVA Output for Treatment   
 Posttest adjusted means 






 Training Control F-value p-Value 2 F-value p-Value 2 
Accuracy 6.6 5.6 24.08 .000** .182 3.74 .056 .033 
Consistency 4.6 3.4 13.70 .000** .113 3.50 .064 .064 
 
 
When compared to the table below, the test statistics are more statistically significant for the 
Professionals only group than the Students only or the Combined groups. This again indicates 
that the training has a stronger impact on the Professionals group, as expected. 
 
Table 5.2.1.2. (Combined Groups) Output for ANCOVA & ANOVA for Treatment   
 Posttest adjusted means 
(adjusted for pretest score) 
ANCOVA  
Treatment Test statistics 
ANOVA  
TreatmentTime Test statistics 
 Training Control F-value p-Value 2 F-value p-Value 2 
Accuracy 7.4 5.9 84.37 .000** .280 49.86 .000** .186 








5.2.4. Testing the Main Effect of Mindfulness 
This section analyses the following hypotheses: H4: Main Effect Impact of Mindfulness  
H4a:   Mindfulness will be positively associated with accuracy in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions.      
H4b: Mindfulness will be positively associated with consistency in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions. 
H4c:   State Mindfulness will be positively associated with accuracy in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions.      
H4d: State Mindfulness will be positively associated with consistency in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions. 
 
Simple (one-variable) Regression: We ran a simple regression with mindfulness measures as 
the independent variable (IV) and accuracy / consistency as the dependent variable (DVs):  
Table 5.2.4: Output for Simple Regression with Mindfulness Measures 
IV DV Std coeff t p-Value 
Pretest - attention Pretest - Accuracy .091 1.35 .178 
Pretest - attention Posttest - Accuracy .097 1.44 .152 
Pretest - attention Pretest - Consistency .103 1.52 .130 
Pretest - attention Posttest - Consistency .082 1.21 .227 
 
IV DV Std coeff t p-Value 
Pretest - awareness Pretest - Accuracy .051 .75 .455 
Pretest - awareness Posttest - Accuracy .092 1.36 .176 
Pretest - awareness Pretest - Consistency .089 1.32 .187 
Pretest - awareness Posttest - Consistency .117 1.75 .082 
 
IV DV Std coeff t p-Value 
Posttest_SMAt  Pretest - Accuracy .199 3.00 .003** 
Posttest_SMAt  Posttest - Accuracy .232 3.52 .001** 
Posttest_SMAt  Pretest - Consistency .157 2.35 .020* 
Posttest_SMAt  Posttest - Consistency .218 3.30 .001** 
* p  .05  & **p  .01 
The std coeff corresponds to the correlations in Table 5.1.2. The above analysis supports 
H4c and H4d only for the State Mindfulness Attention mindfulness component measured 
posttest (Posttest_SMAt). State Mindfulness Attention captures the attention levels of 
participants during the training. The higher attention levels would have resulted in them 
benefiting more from the training and being more focussed during the posttest work sample 
test.  
Checks were again performed to ensure that the assumption of linear regression held. 




5.2.5. Testing the Moderating Impact of Mindfulness 
This section analyses the following hypotheses:  
H5a:   Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training  on accuracy in 
insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser for those 
higher on mindfulness.      
H5b:   Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on consistency 
in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser for 
those for those higher on mindfulness. 
H5c:   State Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on accuracy in 
insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being higher for those higher 
on mindfulness.      
H5d:   State Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on consistency 
in insurance risk underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being higher for those 
for those higher on mindfulness. 
 
Multiple Regression with Moderator Analysis: When looking at the three mindfulness 
measures as moderators, given that they are continuous, we performed a moderation analysis 
in SPSS using the PROCESS macro (Hayes,  2017). The posttest scores were input as the 
dependent variable (with pretest scores entered as a covariate) and Treatment condition 
(training/control)  as a predictor or independent variable and Mindfulness as the moderator 
(Model 1). A linear regression is fitted  and on top of that, another Mindfulness variable is 
added in the regression as a moderator and it is interacted with the Treatment indicator. By 
analyzing the p-value of the interaction term, the moderating impact on the Treatment indicator 
is measured.  
Table 5.2.5. Combined sample (N=220) PROCESS Output for Treatment    Mindfulness:  
Interaction: 
Treatment    … 
Accuracy Consistency 
 coeff t F-value p-Value coeff t F-value p-Value 
Pretest_TMAt .2271 1.08 1.18 .279 .3793 1.28 1.64 .201 
Pretest_TMAw .2377 .98 .97 .327 .2613 .77 .59 .443 
Posttest_SMAt .4044 2.14 4.56 .034* .5626 2.12 4.50 .035* 
* p  .05  & **p  .01 
An interesting result is that not all Mindfulness measures appear to have a significant 
moderating impact.  State Mindfulness Attention measured posttest (Posttest_SMAt) appears 
to have a significant moderating impact. The results suggest that Posttest_SMAt significantly 
moderates the relationship between treatment condition and underwriting quality (for both 
accuracy & consistency).  This variable was also significant for the main effect.  




We further examine the impact of by plotting the Posttest_SMAt significant interaction:  
Figure 5.2.5. Posttest Adjusted Means by Treatment Condition for Posttest_SMAt Levels.   
 
Specifically, when participants have lower  Posttest_SMAt, the relationship between 
Treatment and underwriting quality (for both accuracy & consistency) is not statistically 
significant whereas for participants with high Posttest_SMAt, the relationship between 
Treatment and underwriting quality (both accuracy & consistency)  is statistically significant 
and positive.  
State Mindfulness Attention captures the attention levels of participants during the 
training. The higher attention levels would have resulted in them benefiting more from the 
training and being more focussed during the posttest work sample test (WST). These 
moderating impacts are discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
Hence, in summary, we reject hypotheses H5a and H5b and accept H5c and H5d.   




5.2.6. Testing the Moderating Impact of The Control Variables  
In addition to testing the specific hypotheses above, we also conducted supplemental 
analyses for the impact of the some of the control variables for which we did not have enough 
grounds to posit theoretically derived hypotheses. We specifically looked at the moderating 
impact of Gender and Education (Age was excluded due to its high correlation with 
Experience). An especially interesting, and rather surprising, finding from these supplemental 
analyses is that both these variables seem to have significant moderating impacts.  
Gender: Given this categorical variable, we ran an ANCOVA and were rather surprised to see 
that Gender does seem to have a statistically significant moderating impact on the training with 
the Males seeming to show more improvement from the training:  
Table 5.2.6.1. Output for ANCOVA: Treatment × Gender Interaction 
 Posttest adjusted means 
(adjusted for pretest score) 
ANCOVA Test statistics 
 Training Control F-value p-Value 2 
 M F M F    
Accuracy 7.7 7.1 6.0 5.8 5.51 .020* .025 
Consistency 6.2 5.3 3. 8 3.7 4.97 .027* .023 
 
Figure 5.2.6.1. Posttest Adjusted Means by Treatment Condition for Gender Levels.   
There appears to be a materially higher improvement for males (relative to females). 




Education: Given this is also a categorical variable, we again ran an ANCOVA and were not 
too surprised to see that Education does seem to have a statistically significant moderating 
impact on the training with the undergraduates performing least well. This naturally mimics the 
impact of the Status variable (were all Students are undergraduates and all Professionals 
degreed). Interestingly, Masters graduates showed more improvement from the training than 
Bachelors. 
Table 5.2.6.2. Output for ANCOVA: Treatment × Education Interaction 
 Posttest adjusted means 
(adjusted for pretest score) 
ANCOVA Test statistics 
 Training Control F-value p-Value 2 
 U B M U B M    
Accuracy 6.5 7.6 8.2 5.6 5.9 6.4 5.35 .005* .048 
Consistency 4.4 6.1 6.9 3.2 3.8 4.3 3.79 .024* .034 
 
Figure 5.2.6.2. Posttest Adjusted Means by Treatment Condition for various Education 
Levels.   
 
There appears to be a materially higher improvement for Masters graduates (relative to 
Bachelors and Undergraduates).  




5.2.7. Results Summary 
The table below summarizes the results of the various hypotheses tested above: 
 
Table 5.2.7. Hypotheses Summary and Results:  






H1a: Insurance risk underwriting combined scripts and simple 
rules training will have a positive effect on accuracy in insurance 
risk underwriting decisions. 
H1b:Insurance risk underwriting combined scripts and simple 
rules training will have a positive effect on consistency in 
















H2a:   Experience will be positively associated with accuracy in 
insurance risk underwriting decisions. 
H2b: Experience will be positively associated with consistency 
in insurance risk underwriting decisions.  










H3a:   Experience will moderate the effect of insurance risk 
underwriting training on accuracy in insurance risk underwriting 
decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser 
for those having more experience working as an underwriter.      
H3b:   Experience will moderate the effect of insurance risk 
underwriting training  on consistency in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training 
being lesser for those having more experience working as an 













H4a:   Trait Mindfulness will be positively associated with 
accuracy in insurance risk underwriting decisions.      
H4b: Trait Mindfulness will be positively associated with 
consistency in insurance risk underwriting decisions. 
H4c:   State Mindfulness will be positively associated with 
accuracy in insurance risk underwriting decisions.      
H4d: State Mindfulness will be positively associated with 















H5a:   Trait Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance 
risk underwriting training on accuracy in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training 
being lesser for those higher on mindfulness.      
H5b:   Trait Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance 
risk underwriting training on consistency in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training 
being lesser for those for those higher on mindfulness. 
H5c:   State Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance 
risk underwriting training on accuracy in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training 
being higher for those higher on mindfulness.      
H5d:   State Mindfulness will moderate the effect of insurance 
risk underwriting training on consistency in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training 


















CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. Discussion 
Underwriting excellence is paramount to company performance in the insurance 
industry. Recent research from McKinsey (Chester et al, 2019) looked at leading insurance 
companies over the past three decades  and concluded that underwriting result, more than 
capital leverage or investment returns—has the greatest impact on overall financial 
performance. Hence, companies who struggle to achieve good underwriting results should look 
to make improvements in this area.   
When seeking to improve performance, it is important for companies to recognize that 
underwriting is more than just a quantitative analysis. Good underwriting requires a 
comprehensive set of capabilities across hard and soft skills – and very importantly, qualitative 
judgments (Chester et al, 2019). Skilled underwriters blend quantitative analysis (Bowers, 
1997) with qualitative, forward-looking judgment about how risks and exposures are likely to 
change (Chester et al, 2019). Chester et al (2019) also observed that the highest-performing 
underwriters are those with a structured, intentional approach to analysing risks – hence 
displaying deliberate judgement.  
Underwriting decisions are an integral part of an insurance operation and  among the 
most important decisions managers need to make (Chester et al, 2019).  Achieving underwriting 
improvement can be a Herculean task and achieving and documenting improved results in 
underwriting performance can take up to several years. Hence, it’s is worthwhile for companies 
to explore accelerating underwriting expertise. Thus, we designed a training program to 
accelerate the development of underwriting expertise. Drawing on research on decision scripts 
in the medical domain (Abernathy and Hamm, 1994, 1995) and on simple rules in strategy  
(Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011), we took a unique approach in the present study, designing 
and testing how well a combined training design,  using both scripts and  simple rules, could 
improve underlying insurance underwriting decisions.  




We collected the scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977) used in the training through a 
series of interview with underwriters of varying levels of experience. This mirrored the NDM 
of Klein (1998) as a correspondence studying of how underwriters make decisions. The most 
direct contribution of our study is that it extends the existing work in scripts training beyond 
just the medical domain (Abernathy and Hamm, 1994, 1995) and shows promising results in 
the insurance underwriting domain too. During the interviews to obtain the scripts, we noticed 
numerous biases in the thinking of the underwriters such as availability; anchoring and  
conservatism (Kahneman, 2002) described in Chapter 2. Also, the very inexperienced 
underwriters were more inclined to use only the quantitative approach or ADM approach 
consistent with the observation of Klein (1998). By design, we collected a wide range of scripts 
across a wide range of insurance underwriting cases. The exposure to a wide range of 
experience is invaluable in training underwriters to have the ability to apply knowledge to new 
situations and different domains (Epstein, 2019). 
The training design in the present study combined the scripts with simple rules. Simple 
rules are idiosyncratic heuristics that are specific to a certain domain – insurance in this study. 
It has been argued that heuristics are more likely to work well and be applied in tasks nested in 
complex, dynamic, and competitive environments (Gigerenzer, 2008; Simon, 1955, 1957). 
Heuristics can be used  to solve problems quickly with incomplete information, as is the case 
in many underwriting situations. The simple rules derived in the present study for insurance 
have ecological rationality (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Todd et al., 2012). – i.e. the match of a 
heuristic with a given environment. Our study contributes to the growing research on heuristics 
and simple rules training by testing them in a challenging domain like insurance risk 
underwriting. As mentioned earlier, the adaptive toolbox is the repertoire of heuristics available 
to underwriters to use in different circumstances (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). Underwriters 
and actuaries have their own adaptive toolbox of satisficing (Simon, 1955) and heuristic short 
cuts through the simple rules in making profitability forecasts and underwriting decisions.  




As described in Chapter 2, Kahneman and Klein (2009) describe task environments as 
“high-validity” if there are stable relationships between objectively identifiable cues and 
subsequent events or between cues and the outcomes of possible actions. Determining the 
validity of an environment is not always easy. Our present study finds the insurance markets to 
be a high-validity environment. There appears to be a set of rules or cues that if followed can 
consistently lead to profitable insurance business. This combined scripts and simple rules 
training, integrates with the three main conditions that Kahneman and Klein (2009) state are 
needed for development of intuitive expertise viz.:  a regular or highly valid environment 
(through the simple rules); many opportunities to practice (through the scripts) and feedback. 
The present study tested the effectiveness of a training programme to improve insurance 
risk underwriting quality. The scripts & simple rules training intervention ultimately resulted 
in a better quality of underwriting decisions based on both accuracy and consistency (defined 
in Section 4.6.1). Insurance risk underwriting combined scripts and simple rules training had a 
positive effect on both accuracy and consistency in insurance risk underwriting decisions. The 
results showed that only a relatively short period (2 hours in the present study) of training (see 
Appendix V for training schedule) could have a significant effect on improving underwriting 
quality. This mirrored the findings from Tetlock (2015) who saw improvements in forecasting 
after just an hour of appropriate training. This training technique using scripts and simple rules 
was used for the first time in the domain of insurance underwriting training – and it is very 
encouraging to see the very positive results from the training emerging.  
The training had the impact of increasing both accuracy and consistency of underwriting 
decisions – but there was a clear higher improvement in consistency. The inconsistency in 
underwriting decisions can cost insurers millions (Kahneman, 2018; Chester et al, 2019) and 
any training intervention to reduce this worth the effort. The training gave underwriters a greater 
awareness and understanding of the process, factors and resulting principles or simple rules 
going into underwriting decisions. Hence, they were more consistent and less affected by the 




factors that can lead to noise in decisions. Thus, the impact of the training appears to be larger 
for consistency (relative to accuracy), as mentioned below. The application of simple rules to 
the underwriting decision making process seems to have the impact of improving consistency.  
Experience has a positive main effect with underwriting quality – and does appear to 
moderate the impact of training on underwriting quality. It is interesting to note that this 
moderating relationship does not appear to be linear. Firstly, the students display a relatively 
subdued benefit from the training relative to working professionals. This could indicate that a 
minimum level of working experience is needed for the concepts discussed in the training 
around insurance risk underwriting to be embedded in the thought processes and applied to 
problems. When looking within working professionals, it was interesting to note that the 
greatest improvement from the training is shown by the junior underwriters (1 to 4 years of 
experience). This is consistent with the Hypotheses H3a & H3b that experience will moderate 
the effect of insurance risk underwriting training on accuracy and consistency in insurance risk 
underwriting decisions, such that the positive effect of training being lesser for those having 
more experience working as an underwriter. As hypothesized in section 3.5, the impact of 
training on skill levels is dampened for the more experienced underwriters due to their already 
higher skills levels, which leads to a lower underwriting accuracy improvement.  
The present study did not find all mindfulness measures to have been a statistically 
significant main effect with underwriting quality or a moderating influence on the impact of 
training on underwriting quality. The trait mindfulness measures were hypothesized to have a 
negative impact on underwriting quality improvement – but this did not emerge from the data 
in the study. Interestingly, the state mindfulness attention measure did have a significant main 
effect with underwriting quality and a significant moderating impact on the impact of training 
on underwriting quality. This measure captures the attention levels of participants during the 
training and participants with higher state mindfulness attention showed higher improvements 
in both accuracy and consistency post-training. The higher attention levels would have resulted 




in them benefiting more from the training and being more focussed during the posttest work 
sample test (WST). 
 
6.2. Practical Implications 
Our findings have several important practical implications. 
Firstly, the work of insurance underwriters in practice forces them to make underwriting 
decisions under time pressure and at times with limited cognitive capacity. This is consistent 
with the bounded rationality and “satisficing” concepts introduced by Simon (1955). The scripts 
training and application of a set of simple rules can greatly aid underwriters to make decisions 
under these conditions in a practical way.  
The greatest practical implication of this study is that the training design has the 
practical benefit of increasing insurance underwriting expertise – especially for juniors. This 
study has impact and could potentially save companies many millions of dollars in bad 
underwriting decisions. (Chester et al, 2019)  In particular, given the positive relation between 
training and underwriting quality, our research suggests that organizations may benefit from 
paying attention to and investing in their underwriters training.  
The proposed training design could potentially fundamentally change the training of 
underwriters to include formal training on the important aspects of intuitive and deliberate 
judgement – and going beyond normal quantitative training. The training using both scripts and 
simple rules will help prepare underwriters for assessing new risks in the age of innovation and 
new business models. This form of training will also equip underwriters better for a riskier 
world with these new and emerging and evolving risks. For this, there is naturally no experience 
for even more seasoned underwriters to rely on and the simple rules will form a foundation that 
trained underwriters can use to assess these new forms of risk. 
The importance of quality insurance risk underwriting is growing within most insurance 
/ reinsurance companies. Insurance risk is now more transparent within insurance companies 




driven by a low interest environment (where poor underwriting results cannot be diluted by 
investment returns). The introduction of new accounting standards (such as IFRS 17) also 
require a separate (from investment results) disclosure of underwriting result. These changes 
will come together to make the underwriting result more transparent, increase its significance 
and encourage a move towards more disciplined underwriting.  
Modern day underwriting roles often are specialized and have singular focus on specific 
type of risk e.g. property underwriters (Chester et al, 2019).  The underwriters of the future may 
want exposure to a wider array of risks and challenges. Thus, underwriting skills may need 
expand to encourage more cross-functional and hybrid responsibilities (Chester et al, 2019). 
The accelerated expertise needed for these roles could be developed in a practical manner 
through the training design in the present study.  The training design includes exposure to a 
wider range of risks — rather than waiting for decades to acquire the required varied experience 
on the job (Epstein, 2019).  
 
6.3. Strengths and Limitations  
Starting with the methodological aspects, there were strengths and limitations to the 
training design.  A clear strength was the use of a field intervention for the training and not just 
a quick lab manipulation. A limitation is the lack of a pure random assignment of much of the 
sample to condition. However, it was shown in Chapter 5 (Section 5.1., Table 5.1.3.) that the 
were no major differences between the treatment and control groups. Also, only one trainer was 
used which came with a heavy workload to complete all the studies. However, the same trainer 
used in all studies – and for both treatment and control conditions, ensured consistency across 
the sessions and was a strength of the study design. 
Scripts used in training have strengths and limitations. Scripts are observed directly 
from real world applications in practice – and hence have face validity (Hamm, 2004). 
However, as mentioned earlier, they have been criticized as “rote learning” (Hamm, 2004). 
Also, the detailed observation to document scripts may have prevented it from being applied 




more widely – beyond medical training.  The effort to extract these scripts for this present study 
was a considerable. However, in practice, this should be outweighed by the benefit of having 
them documented. 
Simple Rules – as the name suggests, should be simple to apply in practice. However, 
at the same time, there could be a danger of over simplifying and missing some crucial cues in 
the decision making process.  A novice underwriter will also have very little appreciation for 
how these rules emerged if they have not experienced the actual situations in practice. This 
again underscores the benefit of combining both scripts and the simple rules in the training 
design. Also, extant literature on insurance does not cover the simple rules extracted in this 
study in a comprehensive way. Hence, this study also contributes to the existing insurance 
literature by providing a more comprehensive set of simple rules to apply to assess the viability 
of an insurance scheme.  
The combination of both scripts and simple rules appears to be the most beneficial 
training intervention – in both theory and practice. Combined training provides the key elements 
for expertise to develop viz. experience and exposure to many cases (from scripts); 
systematized knowledge (from simple rules) and the feedback (from the training process). As 
described above, these are exactly the three elements needed for expertise to be developed in 
practice according to Kahneman and Klein (2009).   
The moderating factor of experience is easier to measure and used instead of something 
more difficult like expertise. As mentioned above, experience does not always lead to expertise. 
Also, on mindfulness, some researchers have raised doubts about the possibility of assessing 
mindfulness through self-report scales such as the MAAS (Brown and Ryan, 2003), as is 
proposed to be done in this research study (Grossman 2008, 2011). Overall, recent literature 
(Reb, 2018) suggests that the tendency to be mindful can be measured reliably and validly by 
self-report. Also, mindfulness, while being significantly related to a variety of constructs, does 
not overlap with these constructs to an extent as to suggest redundancy (Reb, 2018). 




Finally, as the test results only capture short term improvements, we should look to do 
more on evaluating the longer term impacts of the training using Kirkpatrick’s model of training 
evaluation (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). The Figure 6.4. below illustrates the four levels 
of the evaluation model:  
 
Figure 6.4. Kirkpatrick's four levels of evaluation model 
In terms of the four levels of training evaluation we have in this study reached only level 2. 
Using this framework, we observe the following: 
Level 1: On reactions from the training, we collected feedback on the training forms and  




Level 2: On the learning impact, this was measured by the difference with the pretest and 
posttest scores which clearly indicated a significant improvement for the trained group (vs. the 
control group). 
Level 3: On changing behavior in the workplace, this needs further investigation. This could be 





Level 3: Behavior 
→ What organization benefits resulted from the training? 
→ To what extent did participants change their behavior back in 
the workplace as a result of the training? 
→ To what extent did participants improve knowledge and 
skills and change attitudes as a result of the training? 
→ How did participants feel about the training program? 
• “Please create an online module which can be used for training new joiners.”  
• “The training was very insightful. It was a great learning experience.” 
• “ Format was great. Please have more often.”  
• “Training was clear and informative. Concepts were well explained with examples that helped 
a lot. 
• ”Good training. Learnt new things.” 




up interview a with a few participants few months after the training to gauge if the skills learnt 
in the training programme are continuing to be used and whether they are successful in 
improving underwriting quality in practice.  
Level 4: Finally, on impacting company results, this would eventually be judged by the future 
underwriting result of the business units trained and compared to pre-training levels.  
 
6.4. Extensions and Future Direction 
Extensions beyond this research should also be considered and could include – for 
example, scripts and simple rules training delivered using blended learning and other software 
tools; extending training to group decision making; developing new scripts over time for more 
innovative insurance products; looking beyond selection rules to procedural rules and 
investigating similar training in other domains outside insurance  
The training intervention in this research proposal follows the traditional classroom 
approach. The use of blended learning to deliver the training interventions should be explored. 
Blended learning (Graham, 2006) is an education program that combines online digital media 
with traditional classroom methods. Face-to-face classroom practices are combined 
with computer-mediated activities regarding content and delivery – e.g. pre-tests and pre-
readings. Blended learning is also gaining more traction in professional development training. 
This research is limited to developing individual insurance risk underwriting expertise. 
In practice, underwriting tasks are usually performed in teams (Chester et al, 2019) and also 
have various referral triggers to higher authorities depending on size and complexity. It would 
be interesting in future to research how teams should be trained to optimize underwriting 
quality. This team dynamic is also an operational risk management safe guard against a single 
insurance risk underwriter making an expensive error. Leading insurance companies create a 
culture of cooperation and collaboration and engagement across functions (Chester et al, 2019), 
including second-line risk management. Teams should be jointly accountable for  results and 




are encouraged to constructively challenge and debate each other. This will foster company-
wide views on underwriting performance that integrate views across functions. Another idea 
for underwriting structures,  could be to have more team-based structures, in which groups of a 
few underwriters are collectively responsible for portfolios or subsegments of a portfolio.  
Insurance underwriting scripts and simple rules are not static – but will change over 
time. There will be new and emerging risks that underwriters will have to question if they are  
insurable risks. As the industry becomes more digital and innovative and new players enter, 
underwriters will need to make decisions on situations that they have not encountered in the 
past - and the ability to make high-quality decisions quickly will become a fundamental 
dynamic underwriting capability. Hence scripts will need to be updated and new scripts 
established and the simple rules will also need to evolve with the new challenges.  
In practice, it would be very rare for an underwriting situation to meet all the simple 
rules identified in this study for insurability. The are other risk mitigation procedural rules to 
mitigate risks which were not covered in the training. Once it has been decided that the risk is 
to be insured, then risk mitigation procedural rules should be used to manage the risk. For 
example, a limit could be imposed on the insurance payout for high risk situations,  to protect 
the company for very large payouts. These risk mitigation rules are at the core of proper risk 
management – and also impact the appropriate pricing for these risk.  
This present study research is entirely set within insurance/reinsurance industry. Now 
that the results have be shown to positive,  it confirms the view that scripts (and simple rules) 
training can be applied beyond the medical field. Given the insights we have gained, we believe 
that this training be applied more widely in the research of managerial decision making and 
accelerating expertise in other domains. More specifically, I  would be interested to extend this 
training technique into other risks / industries close to the insurance underwriting risk e.g. credit 
risk underwriting in banks is similar in many ways to insurance risk underwriting – but will 
require a different set of scripts and simple rules for training. 




6.5. Final Conclusion  
The main objective of this research was to look scientifically into the research question 
of whether appropriate training can help improve judgement and ultimately decision making in 
underwriting insurance risk. We firstly designed the training intervention using scripts and 
simple rules, applied to this field for the first time. We then proceeded to test the effectiveness 
of this training programme to improve decision making in insurance risk underwriting. We 
found strong evidence from the testing data that the training appears to be effective on its aims.  
We found broad evidence in support of most of the hypotheses indicating the viability of this 
new training technique in the insurance risk underwriting domain and confirmed the impact of 
the various moderating variables – like experience and mindfulness.  Hence, the main objective 
of this research has been achieved along with several identified sub-objectives.  
Good underwriting is a core capability needed to succeed in the insurance industry. 
Underwriters need to look at each risk in a fair and consistent way and to ensure that a correct 
level of risk is entering the industry and that this risk is matched by the right premium. Thus, 
companies should strive to make improvements in underwriting and strike a delicate balance to 
manage the tensions of art versus science, automation versus judgment, and autonomy versus 
control (Chester et al, 2019). Excellence in underwriting must begin with getting the basics 
right: ensuring that underwriters are well trained in the scripts and simple rules of assessing 
underwriting risk. Many underwriters will automatically decline a risk simply because it is an 
unusual one – but using simple rules will provide a framework to properly assess these risks.  
The insurance markets are uncertain but, because of high validity,  expert-judgment can 
identify good bets. The proposed training design could potentially fundamentally change the 
training of underwriters to include formal training on the important aspects of expert intuitive 
and deliberate judgement. This will then also help prepare underwriters for managing risks in 
an increasing innovative and riskier world and cultivate a strong underwriting culture that will 
allow such companies to outperform others in the industry.  
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APPENDIX I:  INSURANCE UNDERWRITING SCRIPTS  
Insurance scripts were developed through interviews with underwriters of varying 
levels of experience. In this Appendix we record the scripts for  20 underwriting situations (in 
total we developed scripts for 50 such situations in the pre-study). These 20 situations were 
used in the training intervention (and which also appeared in the pretest – see Appendix IV). 
We show below an example (we start with risk #5) of the detailed interview transcripts 
and notes and this was then used to develop the training scripts (names of the underwriters are 
not shown below for confidentiality):  
Detailed Interview Transcripts & Notes:  
#5. Divorce Insurance:  Insurance product providing coverage for divorce costs in 
the event of an unhappy marriage that leads to an expensive divorce. 
Underwriter Response 






▪ The junior underwriter was at first stumped by this situation – it was 
clear that he had not seen this cover before 
▪ He spent a few minutes thinking about it before providing his view 
▪ He was murmuring from the start on how could we price this risk – 
which showed his quantitative bent 
▪ His focus was to jump immediately into how to price the risk and did 
not consider at all if this is an insurable risk 
▪ The junior underwriter is focused more on the analytical aspects of 
pricing the risk and misses the obvious risk of anti-selection. 
▪ After around 5 minutes pondering on this risk, his final response was 
“ACCEPT. There are detailed statistics on divorce rates that can be 







▪ The mid-career underwriter was also at first stumped by this situation 
– it was clear that he had also not seen this cover before 
▪ He seemed perplexed by this unusual cover and could not come to a 
conclusion on whether to accept the risk or not 
▪ He mentioned that he would need to assess the risk further by 
interviewing the couple to determine the risk 
▪ The mid-career underwriter is rather unsure and misses the point that 
the risk is not random 
▪ I attempted to push the underwriter for a conclusion so that he could 
feel the time pressure which exist in real life situations 
▪ It feels that even with 8 years of experience, the underwriter is not 
familiar with the rules around insurability – which is surprising  
▪ After around 5 minutes his final response is: “Could be – under certain 
circumstances. We would need to interview the couple at the outset to 
determine the risk.”  




Detailed Interview Transcripts & Notes (continued):  
#5. Divorce Insurance:  Insurance product providing coverage for divorce costs in 







▪ The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is 
not insurable.  
▪ He recognizes immediately the non-random potential of the event & 
the high risk of anti-selection.  
▪ The experienced underwriter takes less than a minute to come to his 
conclusion 
▪ He also seems to worry about the ethical nature of this insurance and 
clearly is thinking beyond the quantitative aspects 
▪ It becomes clear that the Chief Underwriter is aware of the rules that 
make a risk insurable – but appears to be using them automatically 
▪ The firm statement from the experienced underwriter is: “DECLINE. 
We don't cover that, quite apart from the dubious ethics involved. A 
simple rule  of our industry is that we insure random risks. This is not 
the case in your example. A spouse could claim that he is unhappy 
and separate from his partner, just to get the money from the 
insurance. It would be naive to insure something like that. Hence, it's 
a clear DECLINE.” 
 
 
We then used the above detailed interview transcripts and notes to develop a more 
concise script that can be used for training i.e. the training script:  
Training Script: 
#5. Divorce Insurance:  Insurance product providing coverage for divorce costs in the event 
of an unhappy marriage that leads to an expensive divorce. 






“ACCEPT. There are detailed 
statistics on divorce rates that 
can be used to determine the 
probability of claim.”  
 
“Could be – under certain 
circumstances. We would 
need to interview the couple 
at the outset to determine the 
risk.”  
 
“DECLINE. We don't cover that, 
quite apart from the dubious ethics 
involved. A simple rule  of our 
industry is that we insure random 
risks. This is not the case in your 
example. A spouse could claim that 
he is unhappy and separate from his 
partner, just to get the money from 
the insurance. It would be naive to 
insure something like that. Hence, 
it's a clear DECLINE” 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. He 
recognizes immediately the non-random potential of the event & the high risk of anti-selection. The 
Junior Underwriter is focused more on the analytical aspects of pricing the risk and misses the obvious 
risk of anti-selection. The Mid-career Underwriter is rather unsure and misses the point that the risk 
is not random.  




We now present the other 19 (out of a total of 20) training scripts used in the training 
intervention:  
 
#1. No Underwriting Life Insurance : insurance cover that pays a flat amount of USD1 million 
on death with no medical/financial underwriting - sold by insurance agents to lives aged 20 
to 60. 






“ACCEPT. Life insurance is 
low risk especially in the 
stated age range.”  
 
“ACCEPT. Life insurance is 
low risk especially in the 
stated age range. Mortality 
rates are quite predictable in 
the stated age-range. ”  
 
“DECLINE. This will lead to agents 
seeking out sickly people or even on 
people on their death beds. Also, the 
amount of benefit would be too high 
for poorer/younger lives and goes 
against the rule of indemnifying 
them.” 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. He 
recognizes immediately the non-random potential of the event & the high risk of anti-selection. He 
also picks up that the amount of cover could be too high for certain lives. The Junior & Mid-career 
Underwriters do not appreciate that Life insurance can be high risk if not sold properly and do not take 
into account agent behaviour or over-insurance.  
 
#2. Terrorism Insurance: Insurance product that pays out a fixed sum assured equal to 2x 
annual salary if the insured is killed or hurt in an act of terrorism? 






“ACCEPT. Statistics on terror 
events exit to price this risk.”  
 
“ACCEPT. The amount of 
benefit appears reasonable 
and there is data on the 
frequency of terror events.”  
 
 
“DECLINE. This is a classic instance 
of accumulation of risk and violates 
an insurance fundamental rule of 
pooling a large number of 
independent risks. The event of 
“terrorism” also needs to be defined 
more clearly. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. The 
accumulation risk  is a deal breaker. The more junior underwriters focus more on data for pricing 
and miss the accumulation issue totally. 
 
  





#3. Heart Attack Insurance: Insurance product that pays out €100k if insured experiences 
severe pain in the chest. 






“ACCEPT. This heart attack 
risk can be priced using 
medical incidence rates.”  
 
“ACCEPT. This heart attack 
risk can be priced using 
medical incidence rates. The 
amount of benefit also 
appears quite modest and 




“DECLINE. This insurable event is 
not clearly defined and needs to be 
more objective. The “heart attack” 
definition needs to be better defined 
objectively in medical terms. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. He 
immediately picks on the fact that the insurance event is not clearly defined.  
 
 
#4. Earth Quake (EQ) Insurance in Japan: Pays for EQ damage to buildings commercial or 
residentialtic in Japan. 
 






“DECLINE. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured given that Japan is a 
high EQ risk country.” 
 
“DECLINE. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured given that Japan is a 
high EQ risk country. 
Remember the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake that struck Japan 
was one of the 
biggest earthquakes recorde
d in the last 100 years.” 
 
ACCEPT. This covers a random 
event and indemnifies against 
damage costs. The risk can create 
accumulation risk that can be 
managed through geographic 
diversification and accumulation 
control through budgets. This can be 
accepted provided the risk is 
appropriately priced. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very methodical is checking through some simple rules of 
what makes a risk insurable. He/she also manages the residual risk through diversification & imposing 
claim accumulation limits. He finally looks at the risk-return profile as attractive. The more junior 













#6. Agro Insurance: Insurance product coverage for input costs to farmers for costs 
stemming from damage to crops from drought/hail/etc. in India. 
 






“DECLINE. Does not feel 
like something that could 
be insured. We will be 
ruined looking at the 
recent droughts.” 
 
“DECLINE. Does not feel 
like something that could be 
insured. The trend of global 
warming makes this 
uninsurable.” 
 
“ACCEPT. This can be viewed as 
innovative insurance where there is real 
demand. Yes, it's a new type of insurance 
with limited data & models. But with proper 
underwriting, the risk should be insurable. 
The benefit amount meets a financial loss 
and covering input costs removes the 
moral hazard risk. We could spread the risk 
through geographic diversification in a 
large country like India. We could look at 
accumulation control & capacity budget 
through limits. Farmers are an important 
political block in India so price increases 
could create some Political Risk. Overall, 
given the higher premiums we could 
extract, I will ACCEPT this risk.”  
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very methodical is checking through some simple rules of 
what makes a risk insurable. He/she also manages the residual risk through diversification & imposing 
claim limits. He finally looks at the risk-return profile as attractive. The more junior underwriters appear 
paralyzed by the availability bias that prevents them from seeing the insurance opportunity.  
 
 
#7. Guaranteed Critical Illness : Insurance product that pays out up to SGD2m on certain 
major conditions like cancer (including minor cancers)/heart attack/stroke in China. The 
premiums are lifetime guaranteed not to increase. 
 






“ACCEPT. This is a standard 
insurance product that can be 
priced using medical data.” 
 
“ACCEPT. This is a standard 
insurance product that can be 
priced using medical data. 
This  is quite normal coverage 
in the Chinese market and a 
lot of research has been done 
on this.” 
 
DECLINE. This is not a viable 
insurance product as due to the 
lifetime guaranteed premiums. The 
future trends for these conditions are 
uncertain making the lifetime 
guarantees untenable. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very concerned about the lifetime guaranteed rates given 
the uncertainty in the future trend. The more junior underwriters miss the concern around the 
uncertainty in future trend. 
 
 





#8.  HIV +ve Life Insurance: Insurance product, providing Life insurance coverage for people 
who are HIV +ve up to USD1m. 
 






“DECLINE. These would be 
high risk individuals who are 
not insurable.”  
 
“DECLINE. These would be 
high risk individuals who are 
not insurable.”  
 
“ACCEPT, HIV+ve lives now lead a 
close to normal life expectancy with 
appropriate treatment. The condition 
can be view as a chronic condition 
and is not uninsurable for life 
insurance. There should be a 
condition that the  Life insured sticks 
to their antiretroviral drugs treatment 
to treat the condition.  
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter recognizes that previously uninsurable risks can become 
insurable over time as the risk becomes more manageable through improvements in medicine. This 
crucial point is missed by the more junior underwriters who do not grasp the dynamic nature of 




#9. Test Tube Baby Insurance: Insurance product, providing coverage for the 2nd – 3rd trial 
costs if 1st trial turns out to be a failure for fertility treatment.  
 
 






“DECLINE. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured.” 
 
“DECLINE. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured.” 
 
DECLINE, this is not a viable 
insurance product as due to the high 
frequency of subsequent failures, 
the premium could be high relative 
to the benefit. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very methodical is checking through some simple rules of 
what makes a risk insurable. The simple rules apply equally to new innovative insurance covers. The 
high premium will not make this a viable product. The more junior underwriters appear scared off by 












#10. Long Term Personal Accident (LTPA): This product pays high multiple of sum assured if 
insured dies due to an accident in China. The rates premium rates are guaranteed for life. 
 
 






“ACCEPT. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured on long term 
guaranteed rates.” 
 
“ACCEPT. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured on long term 
guaranteed rates.” 
 
“ACCEPT. This is a relatively simple 
product. The guaranteed rates are a 
concern – but the trend for traffic 
accidents should be favourable in 
China given improvements ion 
infrastructure and driving ability. 
There is a possibility of initial anti-
selection but this could be priced for. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very quick to identify the favourable future trend and accept 
the long term guarantee. The more junior underwriters were scared off by the long term guarantee in 
a relatively new market.  
 
 
#11. Occupational Disability Insurance: Insurance product coverage for 110% of loss of 
income from the risk of not being able to perform the occupation one is trained for. Benefit 
will be paid in monthly instalments. 
 







replacement is a common 
product and hence must be 
an insurable risk that can be 
priced using data.”  
 
Yes. Income replacement is 
an insurable risk that can be 
priced using data. The benefit 
level appears on the high side 
(>100%) – but we can add in 
a loading for this.” 
 
“DECLINE. This is a classic instance 
of over-insurance. The insured will 
be tempted to claim to receive 
higher income. For insured on claim, 
there will be no incentive to return to 
work. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. The 
over-insurance is a deal breaker. There will be moral hazard risk. The Junior & Mid-career 














#12. Pandemic Insurance: Insurance product that pays out 2x annual salary only if insured is 
killed or hurt in a pandemic breakout? 
 






“ACCEPT. Statistics on 
pandemics events exist to 
price this risk.”  
 
“ACCEPT. The amount of 
benefit appears reasonable 
and there is data on the 
frequency of pandemic 
events.”  
 
“DECLINE. This is a classic instance 
of accumulation of risk and violates 
an insurance fundamental rule of 
pooling a large number of 
independent risks. The event of 
“pandemic” also needs to be defined 
more clearly. Insurers will typically 
not offer pandemic cover only. 
Pandemic is covered in normal 
insurance and should not be carved 
out. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. The 
accumulation risk  is a deal breaker. The more junior underwriters focus more on data for pricing 
and miss the accumulation issue totally 
 
#13. Long term care: Insurance product that pays out SGD500 per month if insured becomes 
frail and unable to work. 
 






“ACCEPT. This long-term 
frailty risk can be priced using 
medical incidence rates.”  
 
“ACCEPT. This is product 
where there is increasing 
demand due to ageing 
population. The long-term 
frailty risk can be priced using 
medical incidence rates.”  
 
“DECLINE. This insurable event is 
not clearly defined and needs to be 
more objective. The definition of 
“frail” should be adapted to use an 
“activities of daily living” (ADL) type 
definition, for example. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. He 









#14. Hurricane Insurance in Florida: Pays for hurricane damage to buildings, commercial or 
residential, in Florida. 
 






“DECLINE. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured given that Florida is a 
high hurricane risk country.” 
 
“DECLINE. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured given that Florida is a 
high hurricane risk country.” 
 
ACCEPT. This covers a random 
event and indemnifies against 
damage costs. The risk can create 
accumulation risk that can be 
managed through geographic 
diversification and accumulation 
control through budgets. This can be 
accepted provided the risk is 
appropriately priced. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very methodical is checking through some simple rules of 
what makes a risk insurable. He/she also manages the residual risk through diversification & imposing 
claim accumulation limits. He finally looks at the risk-return profile as attractive. The more junior 




#15. Exam Insurance: Insurance product, providing cost of exam fees & study material for 
failing an actuarial exam through the Society of Actuaries. 
 






“ACCEPT. There are detailed 
statistics on SoA pass rates 
that can be used to determine 
the probability of claim.”  
 
“ACCEPT. There are detailed 
statistics on SoA pass rates 
that can be used to determine 
the probability of claim. The 
number of previous attempts 
will also be a key underwriting 
rating factor.”  
 
“DECLINE. We don't cover that! A 
simple rule  of our industry is that we 
insure random risks. This is not the 
case in your example. A student less 
sure about passing his exam will 
rush out to buy this insurance. Well 
prepared students will not buy the 
insurance. Passing exams is not a 
random event!” 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very sure in his assessment that this risk is not insurable. He 
recognizes immediately the non-random potential of the event & the high risk of anti-selection. The 
Junior & Mid-career Underwriters are focussed more on the analytical aspects of pricing the risk and 










#16. Cyber Attack Insurance: Insurance product providing coverage for costs stemming from 
cyber attacks on SME businesses. The is an exclusion for outage of the external networks 
e.g. Internet. 
 






“DECLINE. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured.” 
 
“DECLINE. Does not feel like 
something that could be 
insured.” 
 
ACCEPT, this risk can covered. 
Attacks on SME’s could be more 
random and the accumulation of risk 
is limited due to the external network 
exclusion.  
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very methodical is checking through some simple rules of 
what makes a risk insurable. The simple rules apply equally to new innovative insurance covers. The 




#17. Guaranteed Dementia Illness : Insurance product that pays out up to SGD2m on 
dementia. The rates are lifetime guaranteed. 
 






“ACCEPT. This is a standard 
insurance product that can be 
priced using medical data.” 
 
“ACCEPT. This risk is 
covered in standard 
insurance products and  can 
be priced using medical 
research & data.” 
 
DECLINE. This is not a viable 
insurance product as due to the 
lifetime guaranteed premiums. The 
future trends for these conditions are 
uncertain making the lifetime 
guarantees untenable. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very concerned about the lifetime guaranteed rates given 
the uncertainty in the future trend. The more junior underwriters miss the concern around the 









#18. Sub-standards motor insurance: Coverage for the large substandard (high risk) drivers 
who have poor driving records, etc. 
 






“DECLINE. The risk is too 
high”  
 
“DECLINE. The risk is too 
high”  
 
“ACCEPT. We can use data to 
derive the appropriate higher 
premiums for this higher risk. We 
can also extract higher margins due 
to the limited supply of such 
insurance plans. We can also 
closely monitor the experience to 
uncover the more profitable 
segments within sub-standards. 
Hence ACCEPT.” 
 
Observations: The junior underwriters miss the point that high risk does not mean uninsurable. 
The Chief Underwriter picks up that data can be used to assess the high risk and extract higher 




#19. Dental Insurance: Insurance product, providing coverage for unlimited dental 
procedures during a year. 
 






“ACCEPT. This feels like 
something that could be 
insured.” 
 
“ACCEPT. This feels like 
something that could be 
insured. Dental insurance 
products have been around 
for some time, I think? 
However, they may not be 
that profitable” 
DECLINE, this is not a viable 
insurance product as due to the 
regular frequency of dentist visits, 
the premium could be high relative 
to the benefit. 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very methodical is checking through some simple rules of 
what makes a risk insurable. The affordability of the cover could be a major issue. The more junior 









#20. Space Rocket Insurance: Insurance product providing coverage for costs stemming 
from rocket failure. 
 







not feel like 
something that 
could be insured.” 
 
“DECLINE. Does 
not feel like 
something that 
could be insured. 
There is not 
enough data to 
price this?” 
 
“ACCEPT. The space insurance industry does not benefit 
from a large homogenous exposure pool of risks. Whilst the 
insurance industry traditionally relies on the actuarial 
analysis of data by ‘pooling’ individual risks with similar 
characteristics in order to calculate the probability of loss of 
a given risk, there are, on average, only 30-40 insured 
commercial launches a year. Combined with the continual 
evolution of technology of the space industry, there are very 
few statistical events to accurately estimate the probability 
of failure. Instead, launch vehicle and satellite reliability, i.e. 
loss records are important rate determinants for insurers. 
The risk event is well defined & random. The benefit 
amount is appropriate and indemnifies costs of future 
trials.” 
 
Observations: The Chief Underwriter is very methodical is checking through some simple rules of 
what makes a risk insurable. The simple rules apply equally to new innovative insurance covers. The 








APPENDIX II:  INSURANCE UNDERWRITING SIMPLE RULES 
This Appendix documents the Selection and Procedural simple rules for insurance risk 
underwriting:   
Table A2.1: Selection Simple Rules for Insurable Risks 
# Rule Rule description... 




Ideally, there should be a large group of roughly similar, but not necessarily 
identical, exposure units that are subject to the same peril or group of perils. 
The purpose of this first requirement is to enable the insurer to predict losses 
based on the law of large numbers. Loss data can be compiled over time, and 
losses for the group as a whole can be predicted with some accuracy. The loss 
costs can then be spread over all insureds in the underwriting class i.e. the 
mutualisation of risk? 
2 The risk 
event must 
be Definable  
Insurance pays a benefit on a defined contingent event: There should not be 
room for argument as to whether or not payment meets the definition. The risk 
event must therefore be fully definable, in order to remove any dispute over 
whether the loss has occurred (and hence when a claim payment is due). 
3 The risk 
event must 
be Random  
The insured event  should be random and unintentional. Ideally, the loss should 
be unforeseen and unexpected by the insured and outside of the insured’s 
control. Thus, if an individual deliberately causes a loss, he or she should not 
be indemnified for the loss. Moral hazard/ anti-selection is increased if the 
insured deliberately intends to cause a loss. Adverse selection is the tendency 
of persons with a higher-than-average chance of loss to seek insurance at 
standard rates. Moral Hazard is dishonesty or character defects in an individual 
that increase the frequency or severity of loss. 




The insurer must be able to calculate both the average frequency and the 
average severity of future losses with some accuracy. This requirement is 
necessary so that a proper premium can be charged that is sufficient to pay all 
claims and expenses and yields a profit during the policy period.  
5 Benefit 




The payment made following the occurrence of an insured event should only 
indemnify the policyholder for the loss actually incurred; the policyholder 
cannot profit from the claim as this could change their behaviour to make the 






▪ The insurer is able to charge a high enough premium to cover all claims 
and associated expenses while still making a profit – and still be affordable. 
On the other hand, the amount charged to insure an individual or entity 
must be a sum that the insured is willing to pay and must be substantially 
below that of the covered amount or it would not make sense to purchase 
the cover. This could lead to anti-selective lapses. 
7 Principle of 
Equity  
Each policyholder should pay a fair premium according to the risk of loss that 
they bring to the pool. To make sure that each insured pays a fair premium, 
insurers use a series of rating factors to assign the level of risk. In general, the 
higher the risk, the higher the premium. Terms and conditions may be applied 
to policies to further homogenise the risks by removing particular events or 
circumstances under which claims would be paid (e.g. early claims). Terms 
and conditions are also important to help reduce the impacts of moral hazard 
and adverse selection.  
 








Ideally the loss should not be catastrophic. This means that a large proportion 
of exposure units should not incur losses at the same time.  
9 The insured 
must have an 
Insurable 
Interest 
The person wishing to take out insurance must be legally entitled to insure the 
article, or the event, or the life. There must be a recognisable relationship 
between the insured and the risk. Typically, this “insurable interest” is 
established by ownership or direct relationship. For example, people have 
insurable interests in their own homes and vehicles, but not in those of their 
neighbours. 
10 Principle of 
Utmost Good 
Faith 
A principle used in insurance contracts, legally obliging all parties to reveal to 













UW Questions Focus on key risk & rating factors. 
2 Terms & Conditions / 
Exclusions 
Two major categories of exclusion in insurance 
underwriting are moral hazard and correlated losses.  
3 Re-pricing rights 
 
Avoid long term guarantee of rate and maintain ability 
to re-price contracts. 
4 Alignment of interest 
 
Interest of parties in a transaction should be aligned 
to reduce human behavior that could disadvantages 
a party. 
5 Hedging strategies Balance offsetting risks e.g. mortality & longevity on 
the same segment of lives. 
6 Geographic 
Diversification 
Helps to spread the risk of certain types of natural 
perils e.g. Earthquakes. 
7 Product Diversification Combine risky products with less risky products to 
reduce uncertainty. 
8 Accumulation Control 
Budgets 
Limit exposure to certain types of risks – budgets set 
relative to resources such as capital. 
9 Optionality 
 
Observe…and learn to take on more / better risk. 
Justifies making a business decision 
10 Transfer 
Risk 
Reinsurance Transfer the risk to a 3rd party. Reinsurers fulfill this 
role for direct insurers. 
11 Securitization Transfer the risk to capital markets 
12 Avoid Risk Policyholder retain risk Product design can pass risk back to policyholder 
 




APPENDIX III:  MINDFULNESS ATTENTION & AWARENESS SCALES 
This following Mindfulness measure scales were used in this study:   






1. It seems I am “running on automatic,” without much awareness of what I'm 
doing. (R) 
2. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. (R) 
3. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I'm doing. (R) 
4. I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past. (R) 
5. I find myself doing things without paying attention. (R) 
 
Reference: Mindful Attention (Brown and Ryan, 2003) 




1. I can separate myself from my thoughts and feelings.   
2. I can treat myself kindly.  
3. I view things from a broad perspective. 
4. I can observe unpleasant feelings without being drawn into them.  
5. I notice that I don’t take difficulties so personally.   
6. I am able to accept myself as I am.   
 






1. I found it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present 
moment. (R) 
2. I did things without paying attention. (R) 
3. I was preoccupied with thoughts of the future or the past. (R) 
4. I did things automatically, without being aware of what I was doing. (R) 
5. I rushed through activities without being attentive to them. (R) 
 
Reference: Mindful Attention (Brown and Ryan, 2003) 
(lack of absentmindedness) 
 
The measures were presented (with a 5-pt Likert-style scale) as follows to training participants, 
pre-training and post-training:   












APPENDIX IV: WORK SAMPLE TESTS (WST’S) 
To ascertain the underwriting skill of underwriters, I used a work sample test (WST). WST’s 
are high-fidelity assessment techniques that present conditions that are highly similar to 
essential challenges and situations on an actual job. WST’s have been used for a variety of 
certification, training, and performance evaluation for a wide variety of jobs. 
Information collected prior to WST:  




Highest Degree e.g. 
Bachelors/Masters 




Instructions: On the next page are 20 underwriting proposals. Each proposal is briefly 
described. Your task is to make a decision to accept or decline the proposal.  Note that we will 
not provide any further information on any of the decision problems. You have 20 minutes to 
make your decisions, or about 1 minute for each decision. For the scientific validity of this 
study, it is crucial that you make your decisions independently of all other participants. 
Do not interact or communicate with any other participant while working on this task. If 
you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait for the facilitator to come to your 
desk. Please note that your results will remain confidential and only anonymised data (with 
participant numbers & not names) will be used.  
 
  
PLEASE TURN OVER ONLY WHEN INSTRUCTED TO… 
 




PRE-TRAINING Insurance Underwriting Work Sample Test (WST) - test paper 
Please answer as ACCEPT/DECLINE for the following underwriting cases: 
# Insurance Type Description Please Circle 
1 No Underwriting 
Life Insurance 
Insurance cover that pays a flat amount of USD1 million on death with 
no medical/financial underwriting - sold by insurance agents to lives 
aged 20 to 60. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
2 Terrorism Insurance Insurance product that pays out a fixed sum assured equal to 2x 
annual salary if the insured is killed or hurt in an act of terrorism? 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
3 Heart Attack 
Insurance 
Insurance product that pays out €100k if insured experiences severe 
pain in the chest. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
4 Earth Quake (EQ) 
Insurance in Japan 
Pays for EQ damage to buildings commercial or residential in Japan. ACCEPT DECLINE 
5 Divorce Insurance Insurance product providing coverage for divorce costs in the event 
of an unhappy marriage that leads to an expensive divorce. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
6 Agro Insurance Insurance product coverage for input costs to farmers for costs 
stemming from damage to crops from drought/hail/etc. in India. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
7 Guaranteed Critical 
Illness 
Insurance product that pays out up to SGD2m on certain major 
conditions like cancer/heart attack/stroke in China. The premium are 
lifetime guaranteed not to increase. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
8 HIV +ve Life 
Insurance 
Insurance product, providing Life insurance coverage for people who 
are HIV +ve up to USD1m. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
9 Test Tube Baby 
Insurance 
Insurance product, providing coverage for the 2nd – 3rd trial costs if 
1st trial turns out to be a failure for fertility treatment. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
10 Long Term 
Personal Accident 
(LTPA) 
This product pays high multiple of sum assured if insured dies due to 




Insurance product coverage for 110% of loss of income from the risk 





Insurance product that pays out 2x annual salary only if insured is 
killed or hurt in a pandemic breakout? 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
13 Long term care Insurance product that pays out SGD500 per month if insured 
becomes frail and unable to work. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
14 Hurricane Insurance 
in Florida 
Pays for hurricane damage to buildings, commercial or residential, in 
Florida. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
15 Exam Insurance Insurance product, providing cost of exam fees & study material for 
failing an actuarial exam through the Society of Actuaries. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
16 Cyber Attack 
Insurance 
Insurance product providing coverage for costs stemming from cyber 
attacks on SME businesses. The is an exclusion for outage of the 




Insurance product that pays out up to SGD2m on dementia. The rates 




Coverage for the large substandard (high risk) drivers who have poor 
driving records, etc. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
19 Dental Insurance Insurance product, providing coverage for unlimited dental 
procedures during a year. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
20 Space Rocket 
Insurance 




THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
 




Insurance Underwriting Work Sample Test (WST) - answer grid 
Answer as ACCEPT/DECLINE for the following underwriting cases:  
# Insurance Type Description Please Circle Pts 
1 No Underwriting Life 
Insurance 
Insurance cover that pays a flat amount of USD1 million on death with no 






2 Terrorism Insurance Insurance product that pays out a fixed sum assured equal to 2x annual 




3 Heart Attack 
Insurance 
Insurance product that pays out €100k if insured experiences severe pain 




4 Earth Quake (EQ) 
Insurance in Japan 
Pays for EQ damage to buildings commercial or residential in Japan. ACCEPT DECLINE 1
2
  
5 Divorce Insurance Insurance product providing coverage for divorce costs in the event of an 




6 Agro Insurance Insurance product coverage for input costs to farmers for costs stemming 




7 Guaranteed Critical 
Illness 
Insurance product that pays out up to SGD2m on certain major conditions 
like cancer/heart attack/stroke in China. The premium are lifetime 




8 HIV +ve Life 
Insurance 
Insurance product, providing Life insurance coverage for people who are 




9 Test Tube Baby 
Insurance 
Insurance product, providing coverage for the 2nd – 3rd trial costs if 1st 




10 Long Term Personal 
Accident (LTPA) 
This product pays high multiple of sum assured if insured dies due to an 






Insurance product coverage for 110% of loss of income from the risk of 





12 Pandemic Insurance Insurance product that pays out 2x annual salary only if insured is killed 




13 Long term care Insurance product that pays out SGD500 per month if insured becomes 




14 Hurricane Insurance 
in Florida 





15 Exam Insurance Insurance product, providing cost of exam fees & study material for failing 




16 Cyber Attack 
Insurance 
Insurance product providing coverage for costs stemming from cyber 
attacks on SME businesses. The is an exclusion for outage of the 






Insurance product that pays out up to SGD2m on dementia. The rates 




18 Sub-standards motor 
insurance 
Coverage for the large substandard (high risk) drivers who have poor 




19 Dental Insurance Insurance product, providing coverage for unlimited dental procedures 




20 Space Rocket 
Insurance 














Consistency Score:  
Pair P1 P2 UW 
Decision 
Simple Rule Pts 




DECLINE #1. Over-insurance /  
#5 Non-random event 
1 




DECLINE #2. Accumulation of risk/ 
#3 Event not defined 
1 
3 #3. Heart Attack 
Insurance 
#13. Long term care 
insurance 
DECLINE #3. Event not well 
defined 
1 
4 #4. Earth Quake (EQ) 
Insurance in Japan: 
#14. Hurricane 
Insurance in Florida 
ACCEPT  1 




DECLINE #5. Non-random event 
 
1 
6 #6. Agro Insurance #16. Cyber Attack 
Insurance 
ACCEPT  1 




DECLINE #6. Non-rateable 1 
8 #8.  HIV +ve Life In #18. Sub-standards 
motor insurance 
ACCEPT  1 




DECLINE #7. Not affordable 1 
10 #10. Long Term 
Personal Accident 
(LTPA) 
#20. Space Rocket 
Insurance 
ACCEPT  1 








POST-TRAINING Insurance Underwriting Work Sample Test (WST) - test paper 
Participation  # 
Answer as ACCEPT/DECLINE for the following underwriting cases: 
# Insurance Type Description Please Circle 
1 Jockeys’ Disability 
Cover 
Disability cover for race horse jockeys that pays 75% of monthly 
salary up to age 60 if unable to perform own occupation. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
2 War Cover 
Insurance 
Insurance product that pays out a fixed sum assured equal to 2x 
annual salary if the insured is killed or hurt in an act of war? 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
3 Credit Card Add-
on Insurance 
Credit card companies selling add-on insurance with policies 
paying out only around 10% of premium as claims, with the 
remaining being commissions (and profit).  
ACCEPT DECLINE 
4 Storm (EQ) 
Insurance in Japan 
Pays for storm damage to buildings,  commercial or residential, in 
Japan. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
5 Cosmetic  
Insurance Cover 
Insurance product providing coverage cosmetic surgery up to an 
annual limit of SGD1m per annum.  
ACCEPT DECLINE 
6 Flight Delay 
Insurance 
Insurance product coverage that pays a small amount on flight 
delay. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
7 Estate Duty Life 
Insurance 
Life insurance sold to people who are concerned about estate duty 
tax in the US. The life cover is lifetime and entry age is up to 75. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
8 Life Insurance for 
Diabetics 
Insurance product, providing Life insurance coverage for people 
who are diabetic up to USD1m. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
9 Life Insurance for 
Terminally Ill 
Insurance product providing mortality coverage for terminally ill 
people.  
ACCEPT DECLINE 
10 Disability Income 
(DI) Insurance 
This product pays 70% of pre-disability income on becoming 
disabled and unable to perform the occupation one is trained for 
with the rates being totally reviewable. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
11 Critical Illness 
Insurance 
Insurance product providing fixed sum assured on diagnosis of 
cancer; heart attack or stroke – with rates that are not guaranteed. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
12 Taxi/Uber Fleet 
Motor Insurance 
Motor fleet insurance for a fleet of taxi/Uber drivers which offers a 
bulk discount relative to standard motor insurance rates.  
ACCEPT DECLINE 
13 HNW Life 
Insurance  
Life insurance for high net worth individuals (HNW) up to an 




Insurance product that pays out on Parkinson’s disease. The rates 





Insurance product providing coverage for costs stemming from 




Insurance product, providing coverage for bankruptcy costs for 





If you cause an accident that damages someone else's property 
(their car, for example), property liability coverage helps pay for 
repairs. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
18 Direct Marketing 
Insurance 
Direct marketing companies sold insurance through outbound 
calls with policies paying out only around 20% of premium as 




Insurance product that pays out 2xannual salary if the insured 
becomes unemployed. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
20 5m CI over Insurance product coverage for SGD5m on diagnosis of a critical 
illness such as cancer; heart attack or stroke. 
ACCEPT DECLINE 
 
PLEASE TURN OVER 
 




Insurance Underwriting Work Sample Test (WST) - answer grid 
Answer as ACCEPT/DECLINE for the following underwriting cases: 
# Insurance Type Description Please Circle Pts 
1 Jockeys’ Disability 
Cover 
Disability cover for race horse jockeys that pays 75% of monthly salary 





2 War Cover Insurance Insurance product that pays out a fixed sum assured equal to 2xannual 




3 Credit Card Add-on 
Insurance 
Credit card companies selling add-on insurance with policies paying out 
only around 10% of premium as claims, with the remaining being 




4 Storm (EQ) Insurance 
in Japan 
Pays for storm damage to buildings,  commercial or residential, in Japan. ACCEPT DECLINE 1
2
  
5 Cosmetic  Insurance 
Cover 
Insurance product providing coverage cosmetic surgery up to an annual 




6 Flight Delay 
Insurance 
Insurance product coverage that pays a small amount on flight delay. ACCEPT DECLINE 1
2
  
7 Estate Duty Life 
Insurance 
Life insurance sold to people who are concerned about estate duty tax in 




8 Life Insurance for 
Diabetics 
Insurance product, providing Life insurance coverage for people who are 




9 Life Insurance for 
Terminally Ill 
Insurance product providing mortality coverage for terminally ill people.  ACCEPT DECLINE 1
2
  
10 Disability Income (DI) 
Insurance 
This product pays 70% of pre-disability income on becoming disabled 
and unable to perform the occupation one is trained for with the rates 




11 Critical Illness 
Insurance 
Insurance product providing fixed sum assured on diagnosis of cancer; 




12 Taxi/Uber Fleet Motor 
Insurance 
Motor fleet insurance for a fleet of taxi/Uber drivers which offers a bulk 




13 HNW Life Insurance  Life insurance for high net worth individuals (HNW) up to an amount of 











15 Business Interruption  
Insurance 
Insurance product providing coverage for costs stemming from business 




16 Bankruptcy Insurance Insurance product, providing coverage for bankruptcy costs for SME’s in 







If you cause an accident that damages someone else's property (their 




18 Direct Marketing 
Insurance 
Direct marketing companies sold insurance through outbound calls with 
policies paying out only around 20% of premium as claims, with the 











20 5m CI over Insurance product coverage for SGD5m on diagnosis of a critical illness 












Consistency Score:  
Pair P1 P2 UW 
Decision 
Simple Rule Pts 
1 #1. Jockeys’ Disability 
Cover 
#20. 5m CI over DECLINE #1. Over-insurance /  
#5 Non-random event 
1 




DECLINE #2. Accumulation of risk/ 
#3 Event not defined 
1 
3 #3. Credit Card Add-
on Insurance 
#18. Direct Marketing 
Insurance 
DECLINE #4. Not Equitable 1 
4 #4. Storm (EQ) 




ACCEPT  1 




DECLINE #5. Non-random event 
 
1 





ACCEPT  1 




DECLINE #6. Non-rateable 1 
8 #8.  Life Insurance for 
Diabetics 
#13. HNW Life 
Insurance 
ACCEPT  1 
9 #9. Life Insurance for 
Terminally Ill 
#12. Taxi/Uber Fleet 
Motor Insurance 
DECLINE #7. Not affordable 1 
10 #10. Disability Income 
(DI) Insurance 
#11. Critical Illness 
Insurance 
ACCEPT  1 









APPENDIX V: TRAINING COURSE INVITATION LETTER & OUTLINE 
 
 





Programme Facilitator  
 
Gavin R. Maistry is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Lee Kong Chain School of Business, under the 
supervision of Professor Jochen Reb. His other dissertation committee members are Professor 
Thomas Menkhoff (SMU) & Professor Shenghua Luan (Chinese Academy of Sciences).   
Gavin is currently the Regional Chief Actuary & Chief Risk Officer for Munich Re (the world’s 
largest reinsurance company) – based in Singapore. He has responsibility for underwriting; 
actuarial & risk management topics for Munich Re’s Life & Health (L&H) & Property Casualty 
(P&C) business in the Asia Pacific & Middle East & Africa region. Gavin has been with Munich 
Re for just over 10 years and oversees a team of close to 50 underwriters; actuaries & risk 
managers. He has over 25 years of experience in the re/insurance industry & has held 
previously senior actuarial & risk management roles with Swiss Re in Zurich & Old Mutual in 
London & Cape Town. Gavin holds the Fellow of the Society of Actuaries (FSA) & Chartered 
Enterprise Risk Analyst (CERA) designations from the US Society of Actuaries. In addition, he 
is a Fellow of the Singapore Actuarial Society, where he earlier chaired the Education 
Committee for many years. He’s also a CFA Charterholder and is a graduate of the Un iversity 
of Cape Town (UCT) and the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) in South Africa. 
 








Couse Outline: Control 
 
